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INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC LEGAL
REFORM IN TRANSITION ECONOMIES: THE CASE OF
COMPETITION POLICY AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT
WILLIAM E. KOVACIC*
INTRODUCTION
The modern progression toward market processes in nations
once committed to comprehensive central economic planning is one
of the most extraordinary events of our time. Since the mid-1970s,
many communist or socialist nations have undertaken market-
oriented reforms of varied intensity and scope.1 There is no assurance
that this attempted transformation will succeed in all or most cases, as
economic and political turmoil today besets many countries seeking
to rely more extensively on market systems.2 Yet, despite enormous
uncertainty and upheaval in the transition from planning to markets,
economic liberalization still remains the strategy of choice for
boosting growth.3
Competition policy laws that prohibit various restraints of trade
and create public or private rights of action to enforce such
prohibitions have become remarkably common elements of market-
* General Counsel, Federal Trade Commission. Professor Kovacic is on leave from the
George Washington University Law School. The views expressed in this Article are the
author's and not necessarily the views of the Federal Trade Commission or any of its individual
members. The author thanks Kathryn Fenton, Geraldine Foster, Michal Gal, Michael
Trebilcock, and Frederic Vissi, and participants in conferences or workshops at the University
of Canterbury, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Fordham University, George Washington
University, and the University of Toronto for many useful comments and discussions. The
author owes a special debt to the editorial staff of the Chicago-Kent Law Review.
1. Extensive treatments of modem economic reform in communist and socialist countries
include THE EMERGENCE OF MARKEr ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE (Christopher Clague
& Gordon C. Rausser eds., 1992); FOREIGN ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION (Andras Koves &
Paul Marer eds., 1991); INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (Christopher Clague
ed., 1997).
2. See, e.g., Stephen Fidler, World Bank Lifts Growth Forecasts, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1999,
at 19 (describing economic vulnerabilities of emerging market economies).
3. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Knowledge for Development: Economic Science, Economic
Policy, and Economic Advice, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 1998, at 9, 14 (Boris Pleskovic & Joseph E. Stiglitz eds., 1999) ("In most countries,
there is almost universal agreement that markets should be at the center of any vital
economy.").
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oriented, economic law reform in the transition environment.4 Over
forty formerly communist or socialist states have enacted new
competition laws or augmented older competition statutes since
1975.5 Considerable additional activity in the competition policy field
is underway. Within the next decade, as many as twenty additional
transition economies are likely to establish competition policy
systems.6 The adoption of new laws in transition countries is a vital
element in a process of competition policy globalization that has seen
the number of nations with antitrust systems grow to over ninety.
7
The proliferation of new systems raises questions about the
proper scope and form of competition policy in transition economies
and, more generally, about the design of legal reforms in emerging
markets.8 Individual Western countries and multinational bodies
actively have encouraged emerging markets to establish new
competition laws.9  Western advisors sometimes have pressed
4. See Clive S. Gray & Anthony A. Davis, Competition Policy in Developing Countries
Undergoing Structural Adjustment, 38 ANTrrRUST BULL. 425, 427-28 (1993) (describing
adoption of antitrust legislation as a component of structural adjustment programs in
developing economies); William E. Kovacic, Getting Started: Creating New Competition Policy
Institutions in Transition Economies, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 403, 403-08 (1997) (describing
creation of competition policy systems as a component of economic law reform).
This Article uses the term "competition law" to describe a statute of general national
applicability that prohibits specific forms of anticompetitive conduct and creates public or
private rights of action to redress misconduct. This definition omits laws adopted by local or
regional government authorities that do not apply to the nation as a whole. This definition
excludes countries that have general antimonopoly provisions in their constitutions but have yet
to adopt legislation that translates these general provisions into operation principles and creates
a mechanism for their enforcement. It also omits consumer protection measures that broadly
forbid "unfair competition"-a term that could be interpreted to proscribe price fixing among
competitors.
5. See Kovacic, supra note 4, at 403-04 (discussing the adoption of new competition
systems since the late 1970s).
6. See William E. Kovacic, Developing Competition Policy in Transition Economies:
Milestones in 2000, 4 INT'L ANITIRUST BULL. 40, 41 (2000) (discussing perspectives for new
competition systems).
7. Id. Identifying nations with competition laws in the transition environment can be an
uncertain process. In some instances, the collection of information is relatively easy. The
competition regimes of a number of countries have been the subject of extensive study and
published commentary. A growing collection of transition economies maintains highly
informative web sites about their competition systems. In many cases, however, current,
reliable information is difficult to come by, if only because new competition laws are being
adopted at a relatively rapid pace. The best source of information sometimes will be an advisor
who by word of mouth reports the establishment of a new system.
8. See Jean-Jacques Laffont, Competition, Information, and Development, in ANNUAL
WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1998, supra note 3, at 237
(analyzing hazards associated with transplanting sophisticated Western antitrust systems into a
transition economy environment).
9. See United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Report by the UNCTAD
Secretariat, Empirical Evidence of the Benefits from Applying Competition Law and Policy
Principles to Economic Development in Order to Attain Greater Efficiency in International Trade
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transition governments to adopt close replicas of competition laws
typically found in mature market economies. 10  In the field of
medicine, the bases for prescribing a sound regime of care include
formulating an accurate diagnosis, selecting the correct treatment,
monitoring results, and making adjustments over time. Only in
extreme circumstances would a physician treat a complex affliction
with a standardized, off-the-shelf solution on the basis of a snap
diagnosis.
The development of new competition policy systems and the
promulgation of other economic legal reforms have important
consequences reaching beyond the borders of the emerging markets
that have enacted new laws. For business managers accustomed to
focusing on the competition systems of a few Western nations, the
new transition economy competition systems will require ever greater
attention in the preparation of business plans that affect commerce in
such economies. Many emerging market antitrust systems require
pre-merger notification of certain transactions." Such mechanisms
are common elements of modern antitrust practice in Western
economies, and they reflect a consensus that, in principle, meaningful
remedies frequently will be unattainable if antitrust intervention
occurs after a transaction is completed and the operations of the
merging parties are combined. Though the application of pre-merger
oversight in Western countries is not lacking for controversy, such
and Development 2, TD/B/COM.2/EM/10/Rev.1 (May 25, 1998) (finding that "there would be
substantial benefits to be obtained from strengthening the application of competition law and
policy principles in developing and least developed countries in transition in terms of greater
production, allocative and dynamic efficiency, welfare and growth").
10. See JOHN FINGLETON ET AL, COMPETITION POLICY AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
CENTRAL EUROPE 54-57 (1996) (discussing the EU's influence on antitrust laws in the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Romania); Mark R.A. Palim, The Worldwide Growth of
Competition Law, 43 ANTITRUST BULl. 105 (1998) (documenting how the EU has induced
countries in Central and Eastern Europe to modify their antitrust laws to copy the EU model);
Carolyn Brzezinski, Competition and Antitrust Law in Central Europe: Poland, the Czech
Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1129, 1149-56 (1994) (describing how the
prospect of EU membership has reshaped competition laws in Central Europe); Eleanor M.
Fox, The Central European Nations and the EU Waiting Room-Why Must the Central
European Nations Adopt the Competition Law of the European Union?, 23 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
351, 352-56 (1997) (describing how the European Union requires candidates for accession to the
EU from Central and Eastern Europe to approximate EU law, including competition law).
11. See Roger Alan Boner, Competition Policy and Institutions in Reforming Economies, in
REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 38, 45 (Claudio R.
Frischtak ed., 1995) (discussing merger notification requirements in transition economy antitrust
laws); Michael J. Cicero, Overview: International Merger Control, 15 ANTITRUST 15 (2001)
(summarizing national merger control systems); WHITE & CASE LLP, SURVEY OF WORLDWIDE
ANTITRUST MERGER NOTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS (2001) (reviewing merger control
regimes).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
mechanisms are noticeably harder to design and administer in
transition economies than in the Western environments in which the
concepts were first devised. Transition economy enforcement actions
in applying mechanisms modeled on Western practice show that new
competition laws can have a substantial impact on specific trans-
actions in emerging markets and can dictate adjustments in the way
firms plan arrangements such as mergers and joint ventures.12
This Article uses the development of competition systems to
examine economic law reform in transition economies. The Article
provides a context for the development of transition economy
competition policy by presenting the modern debate about the proper
approach to economic development and law reform in emerging
markets. Part II defines the concept of "competition policy" and
emphasizes how nations can achieve important competition policy
goals by a mix of strategies that includes antitrust enforcement. Part
III addresses conceptual rationales for and against making compe-
tition policy a component of reform efforts. Part IV discusses the
initial conditions that typically confront a transition economy seeking
to develop a competition policy system and identifies the implications
of such initial conditions for designing and implementing a new
system of law. Part V considers the implications of modern
experience for the proper design of technical assistance programs.
I. COMPETITION POLICY, ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT, AND LAW
REFORM
The decision to adopt a competition law, or promote the
adoption of a competition law, as an element of economic develop-
ment raises a number of issues about the appropriate approach to law
reform in transition environments and the possible contributions of
competition policy to economic progress. Since the mid-1980s,
multinational donors and individual Western countries have
expended substantial resources advising countries with centralized
economic and political systems about legal reforms designed to
promote economic and political liberalization.1 3 The principal targets
12. See William E. Kovacic, Merger Enforcement in Transition: Antitrust Controls on
Acquisitions in Emerging Economies, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 1075, 1106-08 (1998) (discussing a
challenge in 1996 by Venezuela's competition authority, Pro Competencia, to Coca-Cola's joint
venture with the Cisneros Group).
13. For an overview of contributions of foreign donors to economic development, see
WORLD BANK, ASSESSING AID: WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN'T, AND WHY (1998).
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of assistance have been the countries of the former Soviet Union and
the socialist states of Central and Eastern Europe, although donors
have undertaken significant projects in Africa, Asia, and Latin
America as well. Recent technical assistance programs are the latest
chapter of post-World War II efforts by Western countries with
democratic political structures and market systems to export their
institutions to states with totalitarian governments and planned
economies. 14 The most recent period of technical assistance has
inspired extensive discussion about the appropriate design and
phasing of law reforms to promote economic and political liberali-
zation.15 This Section summarizes some major focal points of recent
debate about transition economy law reform initiatives.
A. Setting Priorities for Economic and Legal Reforms
Efforts to establish market systems in planned economies con-
front a number of difficult choices. The choices are forced by three
basic conditions of scarcity. One form of scarcity involves human
capital. Transition economies ordinarily feature a comparatively
small number of individuals with formal training in disciplines
relevant to a market economy or experience in market-oriented
institutions. The second condition of scarcity involves political
capital. A government committed to reform does not enjoy infinite
good will or political power as it undertakes departures from past
practices that endanger beneficiaries of the status quo. A third form
of scarcity involves the level of foreign assistance. Donor assistance
programs have limited resources and cannot support the full range of
possible reform initiatives.
Scarcity dictates that advocates of economic law reform rank
specific measures by their importance and choose assistance strategies
that focus chiefly on the greatest needs. Modern commentary on
economic reform has tended to emphasize five law reform prerequi-
sites for economic development: 6
14. Post-World War II trends in development work and the philosophy that animated
specific foreign assistance programs are traced in Vernon Ruttan, Participation and
Development, in INSTITLUlONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 217, 217-20.
15. See Jeffrey Sachs, Poland and Eastern Europe: What Is to Be Done?, in FOREIGN
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, supra note 1, at 235, 235 ("The main debate in economic reform
should ... be about the means of transition, not the ends.").
16. See Charles Cadwell, Implementing Legal Reform in Transition Economies, in
INSTITLTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 251, 260 ("The key institutions
of a market economy are property rights, mechanisms for enforcement of contracts, and reliable
and peaceful ways of organizing political debate."); Christopher Clague et al., Institutions and
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1. Creating and defining private property rights and creating
systems for recording and transferring such rights.
2. Establishing contract principles and enforcement mechanisms
to facilitate exchange.
3. Recognizing the formation of business enterprises in the form
of partnerships, corporations, and sole proprietorships and
specifying the means for governing such bodies.
4. Promoting capital formation through the sale of securities,
issuance of debt, and pledging of assets.
5. Facilitating the exit of assets and their redeployment through
bankruptcy procedures.
Pursuit of these aims would not come at the exclusion of other
measures, such as adopting laws to control pollution, prohibiting
restrictive business practices, and addressing other market failures.
B. The Importance of Supporting Institutions
The recent literature on law and economic development shows a
growing recognition that the effectiveness of economic and legal
reforms depends on the quality of numerous supporting institutions
inside and outside the government. 7 Much of the modern emphasis
Economic Performance: Property Rights and Contract Enforcement, in INSTITIrlrONS AND
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT supra note 1, at 67, 74 ("[P]oorer countries as a group have grown
somewhat less rapidly than rich countries, not because they are inevitably doomed to fall further
behind but because the majority of them have failed to establish mechanisms for securing rights
to property, for enforcing contracts, and for establishing efficient public bureaucracies."); Peter
Murrell, Evolution in Economics and in the Economic Reform of Centrally Planned Economies,
in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 35, 49
(describing key legal institutions underpinning market systems); Mancur Olson, The Hidden
Path to a Successful Economy, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKEr ECONOMIES IN EASTERN
EUROPE, supra note 1, at 55, 65. Olson writes:
To realize all the gains from trade,... there has to be a legal system and political order
that enforces contracts, protects property rights, carries out mortgage agreements,
provides for limited liability corporations, and facilitates a lasting and widely used
capital market that makes the investments and loans more liquid than they would
otherwise be. These arrangements must also be thought likely to last for some time.
Id. See also Gordon C. Rausser, Lessons from Emerging Market Economies in Eastern Europe,
in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 311, 318-
21 (describing essential elements of the "legal and regulatory infrastructure" for a market
economy in transition economies).
17. See Bernard Black et al., Russian Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went
Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1731, 1797 (2000).
We have learned that Western-style capitalism is more fragile than we thought. It will
not emerge-certainly not quickly, perhaps not at all-if seeds are simply scattered
widely through mass privatization, to grow in the thin soil of an institutionally
impoverished country. Instead, the institutions that control theft in its myriad forms,
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on institutions results from the work of scholars, such as Douglass
North, who have contributed to what is known as the New Insti-
tutional Economics ("NIE") and applied its insights to explain the
process of economic development.18  "Institutions" in the NIE
literature encompass a broad collection of "socially devised
constraints on individual action."'19 Christopher Clague suggests the
wide range of phenomena that might be characterized as institutions:
They can be organizations or sets of rules within organizations.
They can be markets or particular rules about the way a market op-
erates. They can refer to the set of property rights and rules
governing exchanges in a society. They may include cultural norms
of behavior. The rules can be either formally written down and en-
forced by government officials or unwritten and informally sanc-
tioned. 2
0
In the field of law reform, among the most important govern-
ment institutions are a well-functioning judiciary and other mecha-
nisms for resolving disputes arising from the enforcement of the law.
To some degree, private parties can rely on nongovernment dispute
resolution methods, such as arbitration, to compensate for weak-
nesses in the judicial process. For the longer term, a country's
inability to create courts that are regarded as competent, impartial
fora for resolving commercial disputes will seriously restrict growth.
A second essential government institution consists of principles of
especially self-dealing by managers and controlling shareholders, are an essential
fertilizer.
Id. See also Paul L. Joskow, Regulatory Priorities for Infrastructure Sector Reform in
Developing Countries, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT
ECONOMICS 1998, supra note 3, at 69 ("These regulatory institutions should be created as an
integral component of the entire reform program, not as an afterthought."); Steven Knack &
Philip Keefer, Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative
Institutional Measures, 7 ECON. & POL 207 (1995) (demonstrating links between institutional
quality and economic growth in emerging markets); Laffont, supra note 8, at 30 ("[L]ittle can be
expected in countries where the political willingness is lacking and that in others international
aid for institution building is essential to exit vicious circles of underdevelopment."); Mancur
Olson, Why Are Differences in Per Capita Incomes So Large and Persistent?, in ECONOMIC
GROWTH IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 193 (Horst Siebert ed., 1993) (describing the value of
institutional improvements in raising living standards); Stiglitz, supra note 3, at 10 (identifying,
as a flaw of some economic reform proposals for transition economies, "the lack of emphasis on
institutional infrastructure, including not only competition policy, but also legal structures that
enforce contracts, implement bankruptcy, and ensure sound financial institutions"); WORLD
BANK, supra note 13, at 3 ("Improvements in economic institutions and policies in the
developing world are the key to a quantum leap in poverty reduction.").
18. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE (1990); Douglass C. North, Economic Performance Through Time, 84 AM.
ECON. REV. 359 (1994).
19. Chrisopher Clague, The New Institutional Economics and Economic Development, in
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 13, 17.
20. Id. at 18.
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public administration that compel government bodies to operate
honestly and transparently. Achieving economic growth in transition
economies often demands simultaneous efforts to weaken the state's
capacity to control economic activity and to increase its ability to
execute public functions necessary to the operation of a market
system. The latter category of activities includes the honest
administration of mechanisms to dispense justice, to raise revenue by
taxing individuals and businesses, and to execute proper regulatory
responsibilities.
The effectiveness of government bodies in turn rests upon the
vitality of a number of supporting institutions, both public and
private, that provide resources essential to the operation of the law.21
Prominent among these are universities, which contribute major
inputs to the process of economic and political liberalization.
Universities train specialists in business administration, economics,
law, and public administration. Graduates from such programs take
positions in the government agencies that carry out the new laws or
work outside the government advising those whose interests are
affected by the legal regime. University faculties also conduct
research that informs judgments about existing public policies and the
need for further adjustments. Building a self-sustaining indigenous
capacity in universities and other institutions to collect data and
perform policy research is a key step toward improving the quality of
public policy.
2
Most legal regimes also rely on a variety of nongovernmental
organizations to explain the content of various laws to affected
groups.23 Professional associations provide networks through which
lawyers and others who advise business operators can learn about
new policy developments. Media organizations disseminate
information about rights and responsibilities created by law, report on
economic trends and the activities of individual business operators,
and monitor the performance of government bodies responsible for
21. See Kovacic, supra note 4, at 440-41 (describing how "collateral institutions" influence
the effectiveness of new competition policy systems).
22. See Peter Murrell, Missed Policy Opportunities During Mongolian Privatization: Should
Aid Target Policy Research Institutions?, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,
supra note 1, at 235, 236 (recommending that foreign assistance programs "aim to create a
capacity for information gathering, research, and analysis").
23. See William E. Kovacic, Creating Competition Policy: Betty Bock and the Development
of Antitrust Institutions, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 231, 234-45 (1997) (describing Betty Bock's role in
building nongovernment institutions that facilitate antitrust enforcement in the United States).
[Vol 77:265
2001] INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC LEGAL REFORM 273
enforcing legal commands. Consumer groups inform citizens about
their legal rights and collect complaints about alleged violations.
C. The Sequence of Economic, Legal, and Institutional Reforms
Studies of the interaction between economic reforms, new laws,
and implementing institutions demonstrate the importance of
ensuring that the development of implementing institutions receives
careful attention at the beginning of the economic liberalization and
law reform processes. Liberalization measures are prone to fail
unless preceded (or at least accompanied) by the creation of
appropriate regulatory frameworks.2" The massive privatization of
assets without the creation of mechanisms for ensuring competition
and effective shareholder governance may enable company managers
during the era of planning to loot the productive core of the newly
private enterprises." Institutional improvements-such as the
establishment of effective judicial systems-must precede or be
undertaken in parallel with substantive law reforms, such as the
establishment of a company's law or the creation of private property
rights in land.
D. Pre-reform Study of Initial Conditions
It has become increasingly apparent to Western donors that the
selection of law reform priorities and the design of a process for their
implementation are prone to fail unless it emerges from a careful
initial assessment of existing conditions. One recent assessment of
privatization in Russia suggests that a careful, pre-reform evaluation
of initial conditions might have raised serious doubts about the
wisdom of adopting a strategy that immediately transferred vast
amounts of state holdings into private hands. The study observes:
[I]n the early 1990s, Russia wholly lacked the institutional infra-
structure to control self-dealing by managers of private firms.
24. See Jean-Jacques Laffont, Regulation, Privatization and Incentives in Developing
Countries, in CURRENT ISsuES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 164 (M.G. Quibria & J. Malcolm
Dowling eds., 1996) (explaining how decontrol of natural monopolies requires establishment of
regulatory framework).
25. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1735 (stating that to prevent business managers from
stealing the assets of their firms, "development of a decent legal and enforcement infrastructure
must precede or at least accompany privatization of large firms"); Stiglitz, supra note 3, at 10
("The experience in Russia shows that, without the appropriate institutional infrastructure,
privatization provides incentives for asset stripping-and shipping wealth abroad-rather than
for wealth creation.").
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Prosecutors, judges, and lawyers had no experience in untangling
complex corporate transactions or understanding of the indirect
ways in which company insiders can siphon off profits. Legal con-
cepts of fiduciary duty and proscriptions against self-dealing didn't
exist.
2 6
The requisite initial assessment is unlikely to succeed if under-
taken by outsiders alone. Early and continuing participation by host
country specialists and indigenous research institutions is vital to
develop an understanding of the status quo and to formulate a
strategy for changes.27
E. Determining the Rate of Change
A focus of extensive debate within the reform community is the
appropriate rate of change.2 8 Many donor-supported efforts at law
reform in the early 1990s emphasized a "big bang" or "shock
therapy" approach involving, among other measures, rapid decontrol
of prices, trade liberalization, and swift privatization of government-
owned assets. 9 The essential logic of shock therapy is that the swift
divestiture of the state's economic holdings and relinquishment of
other forms of economic control would best stimulate the develop-
ment of market processes and create a constituency for the establish-
ment of a legal regime to ensure its growth over time. The urgency to
26. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1752.
27. See Murrell, supra note 22, at 237:
Each new institution interacts with a larger preexisting structure. Therefore, the
effectiveness of each new institutional brick crucially depends on its fit with the
existing institutional foundation. As a consequence, if it is to be effective, the
generation of information on the effects of existing policies and the formulation of new
policies needs to reflect the deep characteristics of a society. To know how a policy
will work, one must understand the concurrent processes occurring in the economy. A
model imported from the West is useful only to the extent that it provides a
disciplining pedagogical device, not a magic key that will fit any door.
Id. at 237. See also Georges Korsun & Peter Murrell, Ownership and Governance on the
Morning After: The Initial Results of Privatization in Mongolia (Univ. of Md. Ctr. for
Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS), Working Paper No. 95, Jan. 1994)
(reviewing effects of the failure, in drafting Mongolia's Economic Entities Act, to account for
the existing Mongolian economic environment).
28. See Paul Starobin, What Went Wrong, 31 NAT'LJ. 3450 (1999) (describing the debate in
the economic reform community about the causes of failed efforts to promote capitalism in the
former Soviet Union).
29. For an extensive discussion of the rationale for shock therapy by one of its leading
architects, see JEFFREY SACHS, POLAND'S JUMP TO THE MARKEr ECONOMY (1994). See also
Armeane M. Choksi et al., The Design of Successful Trade Liberalization Policies, in FOREIGN
ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION, supra note 1, at 37, 55 (proposing that a transition economy's
trade liberalization program "should be bold and it should start with a bang"); Sachs, supra note
15, at 236 (explaining the need for "rapid transformation" and quoting a Polish economist as
saying, "'You don't try to cross a chasm in two jumps"').
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implement broad-based adjustments swiftly reflected the concern that
reformers faced only a narrow window of opportunity and that an
incremental process of reform would falter as political opposition to
market liberalization mobilized.
Other commentators proposed evolutionary approaches that
would introduce market-oriented economic reforms and related laws
more gradually.30 The evolutionary model cautions that some big
bang strategies-such as the immediate, large-scale privatization of
state-owned firms-may retard the growth of a vital private sector in
ways that actually extend the length of the transition from planning to
markets. Advocates of the more gradual, evolutionary approach
offer two specific recommendations about the content and timing of
law reform efforts. The first is that the design of wise reform
measures demands extensive preliminary study of initial conditions.
The second is that technical assistance programs should promote the
establishment of implementing institutions as precursors or
complements to adopting new legal commands. In a number of
national settings, these measures may provide a more effective path
to durable reforms.
F. Popularizing Reforms
To have positive long-lived effects, reforms ultimately must
command the assent and support of the general public.31 Gaining
public acceptance for market-oriented legal reforms is a tremendous
challenge in countries accustomed to comprehensive government
intervention and conditioned to view private institutions with
suspicion. The common path of reform efforts is to engage the host
country's elites-public sector and private sector professionals who
often have gained formal training in Western universities or held
positions that provide extensive contact with Western market
institutions.
Extending participation in and support for the reform process
beyond the elites, to the larger body of citizens who live in extreme
poverty or are politically disaffected, requires conscious efforts to
increase public awareness of the rationales for reform and the
30. See Murrell, supra note 16, at 37-40 (describing the evolutionary model of law reform
in transition economies); Peter Murrell, What is Shock Therapy? What Did It Do in Poland and
Russia?, 9 POST-SOVIET AFF. 111 (1993) (analyzing early results of rapid privatization).
31. See Clague et al., supra note 16, at 88 ("[S]ociety has to accept the new [economic
reform] policies, and this is not simply a matter of changing directions at the top.").
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encouragement of public participation in the design and implemen-
tation of specific measures.32 Where specific structural adjustment
initiatives (such as the removal of price controls) can cause short-term
upheaval, sustaining broad public support may require the expansion




There is a substantial debate among commentators about the
relationship between economic reform and political liberalization. 34
A number of American foreign assistance programs have sought to
spur the development of democratic institutions by, among other
means, supporting free and honest elections, building political
institutions such as constitutions, courts, and legislatures, and
stimulating the creation of nongovernment civic bodies such as
professional societies. 35
Programs to promote political liberalization have stimulated
debate about whether the promotion of democracy is a necessary or
desirable element of efforts to increase reliance on market processes.
The literature on development emphasizes that generalizations about
links between autocracy or democracy and economic growth are
especially difficult.36 It is nonetheless possible to identify a number of
distinct perspectives in the commentary. One perspective suggests
32. See WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 86-87 (discussing the value of "beneficiary
participation" in ensuring the success of economic reform projects); Elinor Ostrom, Investing in
Capital, Institutions, and Incentives, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 1, at 153, 177 (analyzing investments in local health and irrigation projects; observing that
foreign assistance programs that "build little at the ground level are a poor investment from the
donor's perspective").
33. See David M. Newbery, The Safety Net During Transformation: Hungary, in THE
EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 197 (describing
strategies for protecting vulnerable groups during the transition process).
34. A valuable starting point for analyzing the impact of different forms of political
organization on economic growth is Mancur Olson, The New Institutional Economics: The
Collective Choice Approach to Economic Development, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 37.
35. See THOMAS CAROTHERS, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD (2000) (examining modem
US efforts to promote development of democratic institutions).
36. See, e.g., Christopher Clague et al., Democracy, Autocracy, and the Institutions
Supportive of Economic Growth, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note
1, at 91, 111 (observing that "democratic regimes differ in their economic effectiveness");
Stephan Haggard, Democratic Institutions, Economic Policy, and Development, in
INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 121, 121 ("Cross-national
empirical evidence on the relationship between regime type and economic performance remains
highly contested.").
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that economic reform progresses most swiftly in countries with
comparatively authoritarian structures. By this view, one needs a
strong national leader to design and impose the package of reforms.
Some commentators point to modern experience in Chile, China,
Peru, South Korea, and Taiwan to support this interpretation. At
least in the short- to middle-term, a durable autocracy may have
greater success in establishing conditions conducive to growth than an
unstable democracy.37 A corollary point is that market decentrali-
zation eventually will create social conditions that foster political
liberalization. From this perspective, measures to promote growth by
the decentralization of economic decision making tend to require a
decentralization of political power and the establishment of a more
politically astute and active middle class.38
A number of scholars have concluded that, compared to a con-
dition of anarchy, autocratic forms of government increase the
possibilities for growth.3 9 These observers caution that autocratic
systems ultimately provide comparatively weak assurance that
mechanisms necessary for long-term prosperity-such as the
protecting of property and contract rights-will be sustained.
Research on the long-term stabilizing influence of democracy has
generated a second perspective on the role of democracy in economic
development-namely, that the adoption of democratic political
institutions ultimately is necessary to ensure that economic reforms
are enduring.40  Without a broad perception that rules affecting
37. See Clague et al., supra note 36, at 114 ("For a country for which stable democracy is
not a feasible option, a durable autocracy with a leader who is rationally maximizing his long-
term tax extraction may be, among the available political arrangements, the one most favorable
to property rights.").
38. An early influential statement of this thesis appears in Seymour Martin Lipset, Some
Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL
SCI. REV. 69 (1959). Later empirical verifications of Lipset's thesis include Robert Barro,
Democracy and Growth, 1 J. ECON. GROWrH 1 (Mar. 1996), available at http://kapis.wkap.nl/
oasis.htm/10643; Ross E. Burkhart & Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Comparative Democracy: The
Economic Development Thesis, 88 AM. POL SCI. REV. 903 (1994); see also Ruttan, supra note
14, at 229 ("[Plolitical liberalization is more sustainable when it is preceded by a successful
program of economic liberalization.").
39. See Olson, supra note 34, at 42-54 (describing how "roving bandits" and "stationary
bandits" have different incentives to establish an environment that induces individuals to create
wealth).
40. See Clague et al., supra note 36, at 114 (reporting empirical evidence that "long-lasting
democracies provide better property rights than long-duration autocracies or short-duration
regimes of either type"); Olson, supra note 34, at 60 ("It is no accident that the only societies
that have enjoyed high levels of capital accumulation across successive generations are the
durable democracies. Every society with autocratic rulers sooner or later is victimized by roving
banditry from the top. Thus, there are compelling and normally neglected practical as well as
moral reasons why the United States should make the promotion of democracy a priority.").
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economic activity are legitimate and without political safeguards
against arbitrary state interference in the economy, the impact of
economic reforms may be short-lived. A corollary proposition is that
a commitment to protect civil liberties is necessary to attract and
sustain investment from domestic and foreign sources.
41
Commentators who have endorsed the development of demo-
cracy as an element of foreign assistance have cautioned that
establishing democratic institutions and cultures will require a
sustained, substantial commitment of foreign support and cannot be
done with short-term intervention or external political pressure
alone.42 Though democratic systems tend to ensure the emergence of
a superior environment for economic growth in the longer term, new
democracies may feature significant periods of instability that impede
investment and growth.43 Experience with individual democracies
also may vary considerably according to the specific design of the
country's democratic institutions, such as the choice between
parliamentary and presidential rule, the definition of executive
authority, and the establishment of rules that affect the level of
fragmentation in a party system.44
A third noteworthy perspective is that the effect of adopting
democratic reforms depends heavily on initial economic, political, and
social conditions. Some observers have warned that the adoption of
democratic reforms in countries with strongly disfavored ethnic
41. See WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 87 (describing the positive impact on investment
projects of a political environment in which citizens enjoy civil liberties, particularly those
related to free expression); Jonathan Isham et al., Civil Liberties, Democracy, and the
Performance of Government Projects, in 11 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 219 (1997).
42. Olson comments that, in promoting democracy in transition environments, the United
States "should either devote the considerable investment of resources and patience needed to
make the effort succeed, or else not intervene at all." Olson, supra note 34, at 61. Olson adds
that "the promotion of democracy is in large part an educational problem: it requires giving
elites in countries without democracy an appreciation of the extraordinary practical value of the
secure contract, property, and other individual rights that lasting democracies provide." Id.
43. See Clague et al., supra note 36:
[Niewly established democracies may require time to consolidate the mosaic of
institutions that characterize successful democratic polities. Executive branch
adherence to the rulings of a supreme court, the education of voters, and the
modalities of transparent administrative procedures do not emerge instantly. Rather,
the multiple sources of authority that underpin successful democracies might in the
early years, when decision-making procedures are underdeveloped and not well
understood or accepted, create substantial uncertainties regarding property rights.
Id. at 94.
44. See Cadwell, supra note 16, at 255-60 (describing implications for executing law
reforms of the distribution of authority between national and local authorities and within the
executive branch of the national government); Haggard, supra note 36, at 129-41 (analyzing
implications of various models of democratic governance).
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minorities may increase the ability of majority groups to oppress
minority interests, particularly where the disfavored minority
accounts for a disproportionate share of economic activity.45
A fourth perspective emphasizes the importance of decentral-
izing political power from central government authorities to political
subdivisions such as regional and local administrations. Democracy
development programs sponsored by the United States and other
foreign donors have attempted to strengthen the capacity of local and
regional government institutions.46  Among other effects, political
decentralization is seen as a partial antidote to unprincipled decision
making and corruption by central government authorities, which
otherwise are shielded from effective monitoring by nontransparent
administrative processes. 47  An unresolved issue is whether
decentralization of power diminishes the ability of interest groups to
manipulate government processes and allocate the state's resources in
ways that disadvantage the public as a whole.
H. Role of the Government in Carrying Out Reforms
The move from centralized power to dispersed authority requires
a basic decision about what role the government should play in
executing reforms. Two basic models of government involvement
have received attention in commentary about economic development.
The first is what Robert Cooter calls "political modernization" of the
law.48 In this model, the state plays the leading role in law reform by
enacting comprehensive statutes and regulations. Foreign advisors
make significant contributions to this process by drafting models,
45. See Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy, and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for
Law and Development, 108 YALE L.J. 1 (1998) (considering how market liberalization and
democratic reforms in transition economies can increase ethnic tensions).
46. See Ruttan, supra note 14, at 220 ("An important theme in the democratization agenda
has been the design of local institutions of governance to empower communities to mobilize
their own resources for development.").
47. Transition economies often have resisted decentralization measures that would give
political subdivisions more control over economic and political resources. Vernon Ruttan
observes that "the strengthening of local governance is often viewed as a threat to political
stability rather than as a resource for development by the national political leadership and the
central bureaucracies." Id. at 228. Ruttan adds that national government attitudes disfavoring
political decentralization "have sometimes been reinforced by the staffs of development
assistance agencies, who often have little historical insight into the evolution of rural
development institutions in the currently developed countries." Id.
48. See Robert D. Cooter, Market Modernization of Law: Economic Development Through
Decentralized Law, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 275, 276 (Jagdeep S.
Bhandari & Alan 0. Sykes eds., 1997).
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which draw principally upon Western solutions and rely on variants of
Western institutions for their implementation.
The chief alternative to this approach is what Cooter terms
"market modernization" of the law.4 9 In this framework, the state
establishes initial conditions, such as recognizing private property
rights and liberalizing trade, necessary to promote the evolution of a
market economy, but it looks mainly to private individuals, firms, and
institutions (e.g., trade associations) to devise specific legal principles
that the state ultimately will embrace. The market modernization
approach de-emphasizes state efforts to conceive comprehensive legal
frameworks at the beginning of the reform process and stresses
gradual, piecemeal approval by courts and legislatures of privately
created norms.
Compared to a political modernization approach, the market
modernization model channels more effort by host country reformers
and their foreign advisors to studying indigenous economic and social
conditions as a predicate for the state's recognition of new legal rules.
Unlike "top-down" law reform, "bottom-up" initiatives place a
premium on identifying and understanding customs and norms that
promote market processes. The bottom up orientation would
discourage rote application of Western legal models in ways that fail
to account for crucial differences in local circumstances and would
force host country policy makers and foreign advisors to study more
carefully, and improve, the apparatus for translating widely accepted
norms into binding legal rules.
Executing a market modernization strategy can raise special
problems of its own. 0 The first obstacle concerns the state's role in
creating the initial conditions that permit the emergence and
evolution of private norms, which form the basis of future legal rules.
One cannot underestimate the difficulty of accomplishing these
foundational tasks, which include creating and defining private
property rights, lifting price controls, liberalizing trade, and removing
unnecessary legal barriers to the entry of new firms. These reforms
will not emerge spontaneously and will demand extensive effort by
the national government (and close monitoring by external donors) to
ensure their implementation.
49. See id.
50. See William E. Kovacic, Comments on Chapter 7, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 48, at 317 (reviewing limitations of Robert Cooter's market
modernization model).
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A second problem involves the process by which courts and
legislatures ultimately endorse private norms. This requires that
judges and legislators have the ability and incentive to identify private
norms that enhance efficiency and forms that reduce it. For example,
a court must be able to make distinctions between a variety of
contractual restrictions-to approve a restrictive covenant because
such covenants enhance efficiency by increasing an employer's
incentive to share proprietary data and commercial know-how with
her employees, but to forbid an agreement among direct competitors
not to make sales in the traditional home market of each. Both types
of restrictions might be widely used, customary norms, but each type
has significantly different efficiency effects. Judges must have the
expertise to tell the difference, and the judicial system must have
sufficient integrity to ensure that parties cannot purchase the
outcome they wish.
The third problem deals with the proper residual role of the state
in addressing market failures. Even a system that relies heavily on
the government's approval of privately generated norms will find
instances in which the operation of the private norms reduces
economic welfare. At least some regulatory apparatus may be
necessary to identify and address such market failures.
II. FORMS OF COMPETITION POLICY: ANTITRUST AND OTHER
POLICY INSTRUMENTS
In discussions among Western commentators about economic
law reform, there is a tendency to equate "competition policy" with
enforcing prohibitions against restrictive business practices. This
might be called an antitrust-centric view of competition policy.
Properly understood, competition policy encompasses a large
collection of policy instruments by which a country can promote
business rivalry. 51 A sound competition policy program need not
invariably place antitrust enforcement at the top of its agenda. A
transition economy might use a variety of techniques to increase the
role of competition as a means for governing economic activity. In
the full set of possible competition policy tools, antitrust enforcement
might not always be the principal instrument.
51. See R. Shyam Khemani & Mark A. Dutz, The Instruments of Competition Policy and
Their Relevance for Economic Development, in REGULATORY POLICIES AND REFORM: A
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 16 (describing policy tools by which countries
can achieve competition aims).
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A. Advocacy
There is widespread recognition that one of the most important
contributions of a competition policy system is to serve as an
advocate within the government and the country at large for reliance
on market processes and business rivalry to organize economy
activity. 2 Government regulations that restrict entry, pricing, and
trade often curb new business development and distort the competi-
tive process. Though most countries feature such phenomena, the
dangers of government regulation assume special significance in
emerging markets where public policies and cultural perceptions
often reflect a basic suspicion of capitalism and a preference for statist
solutions to economic problems. In emerging markets, the compe-
tition agency can discourage the adoption or maintenance of
competition-suppressing measures by unmasking their social costs
and pressing public officials to justify the restriction of business
rivalry.
B. Education and Constituency Development
One important role for a competition agency is to educate busi-
ness officials, consumers, and government policymakers about the
merits of market processes. 3 The competition policy authority can be
a catalyst for debate about the appropriate role of government
intervention in the economy and the correct choice of strategies for
promoting growth.5 4 Performing the education function can help the
52. See Malcolm B. Coate et al., Antitrust in Latin America: Regulating Government and
Business, 24 U. MtAM INTER-AM. L. REV. 37, 58 (1992) ("In any economy, the antitrust agency
can act as a useful watchdog to protect the market economy from excessive regulation. In
effect, the antitrust agency should attempt to regulate bureaucracy and minimize the burden of
government on society."); Ana Julia Jatar, Comment on "Competition, Information, and
Development" by Jean-Jacques Laffont, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE ON
DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1998, supra note 3, at 258, 259 ("A competition agency should
have the legal authority to challenge other government agencies' decisions that conflict with
competitive principles."); Ben Slay, Industrial De-monopolization and Competition Policy in
Poland, in DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITON POLICY IN POST-COMMUNIST
ECONOMIES 123, 143 (Ben Slay ed., 1996) ("Perhaps the [Polish] Antimonopoly Office's most
important (and least-discussed) function has been the advocacy of liberal, pro-competitive
solutions to economic policy problems during the Polish transition.").
53. See Ana Julia Jatar, Competition Policy in Latin-America: The Promotion of a Social
Change 13 (1995) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Economic
Association) (on file with author) (observing that "[cihanges in conduct and attitudes must be
considered one of the major goals in competition policy" in transition economies). Ana Julia
Jatar is the former head of Venezuela's competition authority.
54. A focus of donor assistance can be to assist competition authorities in stimulating
public discussion of economic organization. Cf. Cadwell, supra note 16, at 263 ("[Dlonors can
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competition agency can build a political constituency for market-
oriented policies. Building a political constituency for competition
and other market-oriented solutions may be as vital to the compe-
tition system's effectiveness as "technocratic" measures (such as
raising salaries and increasing expertise through training) that seek to
build the system's stature and influence.,,
C. Research and Studies
A competition agency can establish a research capability that
permits it to analyze impediments to competition. The results of the
competition agency's research can inform its competition advocacy
activities and the selection of possible subjects for law enforcement.
Publication of studies can help educate government agencies and the
public generally about the sources of poor economic performance.
One model for such research is Hernando de Soto's formative study
of the informal sector in Peru.56 De Soto and a team of researchers
examined the impact of public regulations involving housing,
transportation, and retailing in Lima. The study suggested how
adjustments in various government regulatory policies discouraged
entrepreneurs from making the type of "sunk" investments that often
are instrumental in spurring growth. De Soto and his colleagues
documented how a more austere regulatory regime would reduce
entry barriers and improve public administration by reducing the
number of opportunities for public officials to accept bribes for giving
necessary approvals.
Similar work by competition authorities in other countries would
provide highly informative perspectives on domestic obstacles to
competition. In many instances, the barriers to rivalry might not be
immediately apparent. A number of transition economies have
taxation mechanisms that feature high marginal rates, poor success in
making collections, and extraordinarily complex codes that confer
tremendous discretion on individual tax officials and create
contribute to broadening of public debate, especially among the idea elites who lead opinion in
democracies: journalists, academics and researchers, and officials in competing centers of
power."); WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 57 ("Stimulating debate in civil society about policy
is an intangible way for development assistance to influence policy reform.").
55. See Haggard, supra note 36, at 144 ("For agencies to sustain themselves over time, they
must also build on bases of constituent support.").
56. HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE OTHER PATH: THE INVISIBLE REVOLUTION IN THE THIRD
WORLD (1989).
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compelling temptations for corruption. 7 The operation of such
systems deters new business entry and expansion by existing
entrepreneurs. As identified by a competition agency's study, reform
of the taxation system-reducing rates, improving collections, and
imposing integrity-related administrative safeguards -could enhance
competition by encouraging entry.58
A second possible focal point for attention could be preferences
that some economies confer upon state-owned enterprises ("SOEs").
In a number of countries, SOEs have special access to cheap land and
favorable credit. Private entrepreneurs can face substantial cost
disadvantages in seeking to compete with public enterprises. Foreign
investors sometimes cannot purchase land directly but must engage in
joint ventures with SOEs to build and operate facilities.
In many countries, deficiencies in the financial services market
discourage entry. Where the state prevents the establishment or
growth of private commercial banks, individual entrepreneurs often
must raise capital by saving net revenues and seeking loans from
customers, family members, and friends. Such loans might enable a
small business operator to amass modest amounts of money, but
recourse to these devices precludes assembling the sums needed to
undertake a significant expansion of operations.
In other settings, frailties in the mechanism for registering and
recognizing business enterprises can discourage entry. In Vietnam,
entrepreneurs must prepare a registration form that requires them,
among other information, to specify their business plan. Various
government officials review the application and have authority to
reject the applicant if they believe the business plan is deficient. One
possible deficiency is that the applicant seeks to enter a field already
occupied by an SOE or otherwise wishes to do business in a sector
with "excess" capacity. Simplification of the registration process and
elimination of reviews of business plans as elements of the reforming
Vietnam's companies law would promote entry.
57. See infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text (describing difficulties with taxation
systems in transition economies).
58. See Vito Tanzi & Anthony Pellechio, The Reform of Tax Administration, in
INSITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 273 (describing recent
experience with technical assistance programs to improve tax administration in transition
economies).
59. See Report on Recommendations on Building and Improving Economic Legal
Framework in Vietnam, U.N. Development Programme, at 155-58, U.N. Doc. VIE/94/110
(1998) (recommending reducing legal obstacles to the creation of new enterprises).
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D. Antitrust Enforcement
A fourth component of competition policy is the one that ap-
pears most prominently in discussions about competition and law
reform: the enforcement of prohibitions against restrictive business
practices. There is considerable room for variation in determining
which commands a transition country should adopt and in deciding
the sequence of efforts to apply them. A country reasonably could
choose a strategy that begins with enacting basic prohibitions on hard
core horizontal restraints, such as collusive tendering, and gradually
adds a fuller collection of prohibitions.60 Alternatively, a country
could adopt a more elaborate set of antitrust measures, but with an
express commitment to focus on simpler enforcement tasks at first
and expand its operations to apply more conceptually complex and
resource-intensive commands over time as the institution's capability
grows.
A good case can be made for including some level of law en-
forcement in the competition agency's initial package of responsibili-
ties. It will be impossible for the competition agency to become
proficient in antitrust enforcement if it does not gain experience in
investigating and prosecuting cases.61 Yet a decision to undertake
some enforcement measures does not mean that a nation must
attempt everything. There is no principle of sound implementation
that compels a country to make law enforcement the central
component of its early competition policy strategy or to adopt a full
collection of Western-style prohibitions as part of its initial compe-
tition policy regime.
E. Implications
Discussions about the desirability of competition policy as a
component of economic development need not automatically assume
that a competition policy system will consist exclusively, or even
chiefly, of enforcing antitrust prohibitions. Nations can tailor
60. See Coate et al., supra note 52, at 81-82 (recommending that in Latin American
countries "prohibitions on price fixing should represent the core antitrust policy"; concluding
that enforcement priorities should not include non-price horizontal agreements, vertical
restraints, or price discrimination); Jatar, supra note 52, at 259 (observing that competition rules
in recently liberalized economies "should prohibit horizontal agreements among competitors,
including price cartels").
61. Cf. Black et al., supra note 17, at 1735 (observing, in the context of discussing
privatization and corporate governance in Russia, that "to learn to prosecute fraud and self-
dealing, regulators need some fraud and self-dealing to practice on").
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competition policy systems to suit their unique needs and capabilities
through their initial choice of tools (e.g., advocacy, education,
research, and law enforcement) for promoting market rivalry,
through the relative emphasis that the new competition agency gives
to these tools as it begins operations and matures, and through
adjustments to the agency's powers over time to alter the initial
collection of policy tools. There is considerable room to account for
specific national circumstances and changing capabilities through the
initial definition of responsibilities and creation of policymaking
instruments, the sequencing of activities, and the adjustment of
powers over time.
III. COMPETITION POLICY AS AN ELEMENT OF LAW REFORM
The design of a competition policy program can follow various
approaches that involve different combinations of policy instruments.
Despite the widely acclaimed benefits of competition in promoting
economic progress, the inclusion of competition policy on the
transition economy reform agenda has stimulated controversy. This
Section examines arguments for and against making competition
policy an ingredient of reform and offers a synthesis of these views
that emphasizes possibilities for varying the content of competition
policy according to the institutional capabilities of the transition
economy.
A. The Critique of Competition Policy as an Element of Reform
The widespread adoption of new competition policy systems in
transition economies has not attracted unqualified praise. A number
of commentators have criticized efforts by Western governments and
multinational donors to adopt competition statutes or make
competition laws a high priority for law reform.62 The major themes
of this literature are presented below.
62. Notable contributions to the critical literature include: Cooter, supra note 48; Paul E.
Godek, A Chicago-School Approach to Antitrust for Developing Economies, 43 ANTITRUST
BULL 261 (1998); Paul E. Godek, One U.S. Export Eastern Europe Does Not Need, 15
REGULATION 20 (1992) [hereinafter Godek, One U.S. Export]; Laffont, supra note 8; A.E.
Rodriguez & Mark D. Williams, The Effectiveness of Proposed Antitrust Programs for
Developing Economies, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 209 (1994); Armando E. Rodriguez &
Malcolm B. Coate, Limits to Antitrust Policy for Reforming Economies, 18 HOUS. J. INT'L L.
311 (1996); Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist Economies, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1, 45-46 (1994).
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1. The Foreign Trade Liberalization Alternative
Some commentators address the competition policy issue by
arguing that transition economies seeking to improve competition will
achieve far more by liberalizing trade than by creating laws to attack
private trade restraints. The core of such a policy would be to
dismantle tariff and nontariff barriers to imports of foreign goods.
The trade liberalization advocates suggest that removing obstacles to
imports will supply an effective means for disciplining domestic
producers of tradable goods, particularly in smaller economies. 63
2. Facilitating Domestic Trade
A second criticism of creating programs to challenge trade re-
straints is that a transition economy's public resources are better
invested in initiatives to improve the flow of goods and the provision
of services within its own borders. One focus of such a program
would be to eliminate government regulations that restrict the
shipment of goods outside of specific regions or otherwise induce
producers to sell their output to local purchasers only.64 A second
strategy would be to invest more public funds in airports, communi-
cations systems, highways, port facilities, railroads, and other
infrastructure assets whose improvement could give consumers access
to a wider range of potential sellers.65
3. Dangers of Misguided Competition Law Enforcement
Critics of antimonopoly enforcement as a law reform element
contend that transition economy officials too often will misapply
competition policy commands and retard the development of free
63. See Cooter, supra note 48, at 306 ("The pressure of international competition is more
reliable and relentlessly procompetitive than the activities of antitrust officials. Developing
nations can accomplish many goals of antitrust policy through free trade without the state
creating an enforcement bureaucracy.... Free trade is, consequently, the best antitrust
policy."); Godek, One U.S. Export, supra note 62, at 20 ("Free trade stimulates wealth creation
and development, and in a small country it makes antitrust concerns largely irrelevant.").
64. See ANNETrE W. BROWN Er AL., THE MYTH OF MONOPOLY: A NEW VIEW OF
INDUSTRIAL STRUCTURE IN RUSSIA 38-39 (world Bank, Policy Research Paper No. 1331,
1993) (discussing how reducing regional and local limits on entry and shipments of goods could
improve Russia's distribution system).
65. See Laffont, supra note 8, at 245 ("Beyond institutional weaknesses, competition is
weak in developing countries because transactions are localized as a result of poor
communications systems and inefficient trading organizations. Focusing attention on these
areas should be useful, but these problems call even more for investments in infrastructure than
for better competition policy.").
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markets and the decentralization of political power.6  In this
perspective, antitrust is excessively prone to become another
instrument of central government control that hinders the growth of a
relatively fragile private sector. Excesses in enforcement that might
be acceptable in wealthy Western countries can be especially
damaging in emerging markets. In countries with a deep-seated
culture of rent-seeking and weak or corrupt systems of public
administration, well-established political and economic interests may
readily subvert the competition policy system to protect the existing
distribution of wealth and privilege in society. Possibilities for faulty
enforcement increase where transition economy competition agencies
lack adequate expertise and physical resources. 67 In nations where
disfavored ethnic minorities account for an especially high share of
activity in certain industries or functional areas (such as distribution),
antimonopoly prohibitions on "abusive" conduct by "dominant"
firms might serve as tools by which the majority oppresses the
minority.
4. High Opportunity Costs in the Reform Process
Nations undertaking the transition from central planning to
reliance on markets typically face a daunting collection of reform
needs. These include enhancing the protection of private property
rights, privatizing publicly owned enterprises, building a regime of
contract enforcement, creating a legal framework for the founding
and dissolution of business entities, and forming legal institutions
66. See Godek, One U.S. Export, supra note 62, at 21 ("The potential harm of misguided
antitrust policy to newly emerging economies should not be discounted."); Laffont, supra note
8, at 252 ("Poorly designed and applied competition laws can even discourage trade and foreign
investment."); Rubin, supra note 62, at 45-46 (describing ineffectiveness and frailties of antitrust
enforcement in developing economies).
67. Some commentators who approve transition economies' adoption of antimonopoly
statutes point out how some controls-particularly those designed to address the abuse of a
dominant market position-are particularly vulnerable to misuse. See Robert D. Willig, Anti-
Monopoly Policies and Institutions, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKEr ECONOMIES IN EASTERN
EUROPE, supra note 1, at 187, 195 ("Anti-monopoly laws with broad provisions permitting
intervention against dominant-firm behavior and 'price gouging' pose the danger of chilling the
very investment and entrepreneurship that emerging economies sorely need."). But see Ross C.
Singleton, Competition Policy for Developing Countries: A Long-Run, Entry-Based Approach,
15 CONTEMP. ECON. POL'Y 1, 7 (1997) (maintaining that transition economy antitrust systems
should give competition authorities "substantial discretion in challenging the business practices
of dominant firms"; law should treat various practices as prima facie evidence of violation and
require dominant firms to offer efficiency justifications; behavior that "could be specified and
scrutinized in this manner likely would include exclusive dealing arrangements, refusal to deal,
predation, access to essential facilities, vertical mergers, and perhaps horizontal and even
conglomerate mergers").
[Vol 77:265
2001] INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS FOR ECONOMIC LEGAL REFORM 289
(such as laws allowing securing lending) to promote the formation of
capital.61 Some scholars observe that establishing competition policy
and antitrust enforcement mechanisms can divert scarce transition
economy resources away from achieving higher reform priorities. 69 In
this view, competition policy and antitrust enforcement warrant
attention only after a transition economy has made considerable
progress toward laying other foundations for a market system.
Concerns about the sequencing of reforms rest partly on the
awareness that many transition economies have a relatively small
pool of public officials with expertise in market-related economics
available to administer economic law reform efforts.70 The limited
number of officials with such expertise often must manage de-
manding, diverse portfolios of economic reform initiatives. Time
consumed in overseeing the pursuit of one reform initiative -drafting
laws, meeting with foreign advisors, consulting with government and
nongovernmental constituencies inside the country, and participating
in the creation of new government bodies-comes at the expense of
completing other projects. The opportunity costs in the transition
environment of allocating scarce resources to inferior priorities are
substantial.
5. Summary: A Skeptics' Consensus for a Modest Competition
System?
Many commentators who have criticized efforts to transplant
elaborate replicas of Western antimonopoly systems into transition
economies appear to see benefits in establishing properly limited
competition policy mechanisms and giving a government agency at
least some enforcement powers. Critics of elaborate Western-based
68. See William E. Kovacic, Designing and Implementing Competition and Consumer
Protection Reforms in Transitional Economies: Perspectives from Mongolia, Nepal, Ukraine, and
Zimbabwe, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1197, 1200-01 (1995) (describing obstacles to entrepreneurship
in Ukraine due to a lack of well-defined property rights and a reliable contract enforcement
mechanism).
69. Paul Godek casts the argument in these terms:
East Europeans have limited resources and much more important things to worry
about at this precarious stage in their development. Worrying about antitrust issues
shows an unhealthy anxiety about the imagined ills of capitalism. Exporting antitrust
to Eastern Europe is like giving a silk tie to a starving man. It is superfluous; a starving
man has much more immediate needs. And if the tie is knotted too tightly he won't be
able to eat what little there is available to him.
Godek, One U.S. Export, supra note 62, at 21.
70. See Kovacic, supra note 68, at 1213 (discussing limited availability in many transition
economies of indigenous expertise in market-oriented economics or law).
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transplants appear to see a useful role for a national competition
agency to perform advocacy and education functions. 71 Some skeptics
also seem to endorse the establishment and enforcement of antitrust
controls on cartels and perhaps other forms of trade restraints., To
sum up their views, the critics would accept a competition policy
system that emphasized advocacy and enforced prohibitions on naked
trade restraints. They would not establish competition laws that
prohibit the full range of behavior-abuse of a dominant position,
mergers, vertical restraints, and price discrimination-commonly
subject to antitrust oversight in older Western competition systems.7 3
While acknowledging a potentially useful role for competition policy
programs that entail advocacy, education, and carefully delimited
enforcement duties, these observers predict that the immediate gains
to transition economies are likely to be modest, at best, and warn
against efforts by Western advisors to make heroic claims about the
impact of adopting new systems.
74
B. Rationales for Competition Policy and Antitrust Enforcement
Many participants in the debate about economic law reform take
a sanguine view about the contributions of competition policy,
including enforcement of prohibitions against trade restraints, to
economic growth. 75  Commentators who favor making competition
71. See Laffont, supra note 8, at 245 (noting that "a competition agency can play a valuable
educational role in advocating the social benefits of fair competition.").
72. See Cooter, supra note 48, at 309 ("Free trade... may not be enough to destabilize
cartels created by overt agreements. Courts should not enforce such agreements and the
antitrust authorities should undermine them."); Laffont, supra note 8, at 244-45 ("[D]esigning
simple and transparent rules for developing countries, particularly to prevent horizontal
collusion and abuse of dominant position, remains a worthy task.").
73. See Laffont, supra note 8, at 244 (concluding that "U.S.-style competition policy-with
its armada of lawyers and economists-is neither affordable nor implementable").
74. Laffont offers a representative statement of this assessment:
[T]he benefits that can be expected from competition policy in very poor countries will
be quite small for the foreseeable future, for several reasons. Complexities and
ambiguities remain in the economic analysis of predatory behavior and vertical
restraints. Emerging industries will necessarily be highly monopolistic, yet competition
agencies lack expertise and information, and interest groups have considerable
discretion and potential for interference.
Id. at 245.
75. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1800 (calling competition policy one of the "essential
accompaniments" in the privatization process); James Langenfeld & Marsha W. Blitzer, Is
Competition Policy the Last Thing Central and Eastern Europe Need?, 6 AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
347, 367-76 (1991) (discussing the impact of antitrust laws in creating competition in Central
and Eastern Europe); Sachs, supra note 15, at 238 (stating that state-owned enterprises in
transition economies "must be subjected to real market disciplines" by, among other means,
"antitrust policies to break up industrial giants"); Richard Schmalensee, Comment on
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policy a central element of law reform in transition economies offer
the following justifications.
1. Catalyst for Market Reforms
Many reforms proposed as alternatives to antimonopoly en-
forcement -including trade liberalization and other forms of
deregulation-require government institutions to surrender power
and contradict the preferences of powerful economic interests that
benefit from the regulatory status quo. There is little reason to
believe, either, that reform measures will arise spontaneously within
government institutions that have spawned and profited from
competition-suppressing policies. Beneficiaries of the ancien regime
are unlikely to surrender power passively.76 Even when donors elicit
reform commitments as conditions for approving financial assistance,
governments have proven themselves adept at subverting the impact
of nominal reforms through outright neglect or subtle forms of
resistance in implementation.
77
A competition policy agency can supply an institutional counter-
weight within the government to promote liberalization measures and
resist overt or subtle efforts to sabotage market-oriented reforms.
Through a variety of advocacy and education activities, the compe-
tition agency can provide valuable support for policy measures, such
as trade liberalization, that some observers have advanced as
alternatives to antitrust enforcement. Specific focal points of activity
"Competition, Information, and Development," by Jean-Jacques Laffont, in ANNUAL WORLD
BANK CONFERENCE ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 1998, supra note 3, at 262,265 ("I contend
that a competition policy focused on blatant cartel behavior and mergers to monopoly would be
relatively cheap and could have substantial benefits in developing countries."); Spencer Weber
Waller & Rafael Muente, Competition Law for Developing Countries: A Proposal for an
Antitrust Regime in Peru, 21 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 159 (1989) (maintaining that competition
law can be vital to developing an effective national economy); Willig, supra note 67, at 195
(stating that emerging markets correctly recognize that "anti-monopoly policy is integral to the
process of transition").
76. See Jeffrey Sachs, In Defense of Russia's Reformers, WALL ST. J., Dec. 30, 1993, at A8
(describing "hand-to-hand political combat" between economic reformers and the "communist
old guard" in Russia).
77. See Ana Julia Jatar, supra note 53, at 2-3 (discussing how despite nominal programs to
encourage economic liberalization, Latin American governments continue to restrict
competition through use of price controls, limits on entry, and public ownership of various
industries); PETER MURRELL ET AL, THE CULTURE OF POLICYMAKING IN THE TRANSITION
FROM SOCIALISM: PRICE POLICY IN MONGOLIA 7 (Univ. of Md. Ctr. for Institutional Reform
and the Informal Sector (IRIS), Working Paper No. 32, 1992) (examining how, despite
economic liberalization measures, the Mongolian government continued to implement earlier
centralization policies, including price controls).
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include participation in developing privatization programs, 8 advising
legislators on drafting economic reform legislation,79 and participating
in regulatory proceedings conducted by other government institutions
(such as public utility regulatory commissions) with authority to
determine competition policy in specific economic sectors.
2. Preserving the Benefits of Privatization
Foreign assistance programs commonly emphasize the need for
transition economies to privatize a wide range of state-owned assets.
Privatization programs often raise significant competition policy
issues. Without adequate attention to competition concerns, the
strategy and methods chosen to alienate assets may simply reincar-
nate obdurate state-owned monopolies as durable privately held
monopolies.80 A number of commentators have concluded that
measures designed to promote competition are a vital predicate to the
success of privatization.81
As part of a competition policy program, the host country might
design the privatization process to transform the state enterprise
monopolist into two or more viable successor firms. A competition
policy agency -either acting solely in an advocacy capacity within the
government or exercising authority to veto certain privatization
plans-can promote the achievement of privatization results that
increase future prospects for competition.8 2
Competition policy oversight in the post-privatization period also
can serve to ensure that the public reaps the benefits of creating
private property rights.83  Where the government dissolves a
78. See infra notes 80-84 and accompanying text (reviewing possible contributions of a
competition policy program to the privatization process).
79. See Kovacic, supra note 68, at 1204-05 (describing possible contributions of a
competition agency in reforming the legal structure governing the regulation of natural
monopolies).
80. See Stiglitz, supra note 3, at 10 ("Turning a state monopoly into a private monopoly...
is unlikely to help create a more dynamic market economy.").
81. See Laffont, supra note 8, at 253 ("Privatization and formal liberalization are likely to
lead to private monopolies, which will generate resources for interest groups apt to resist further
development of authentic competition. Efforts to impose these reforms before a credible set of
institutions-for regulation, competition policy, financial regulation-has been designed will
yield disappointing results."); Stiglitz, supra note 3, at 10 ("[Clompetition remains thwarted in
many of the former socialist economies that pursued privatization first.").
82. See Vladimir Capelik & Ben Slay, Antinonopoly Policy and Monopoly Regulation in
Russia, in DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION POLICY IN POST-COMMUNIST
ECONOMIES, supra note 52, at 57 (describing the role of Russia's antimonopoly authority in
promoting disaggregation of the construction industry as part of the privatization process).
83. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1800 ("Just as it helps to install controls on self-
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monolithic public enterprise into a number of privately-owned
successor firms, the successors may seek to use mergers, holding
companies, or other institutional arrangements to re-establish the
monopoly structure of the public ownership era. Some forms of
consolidation or cooperation will increase efficiency by enabling the
participants, for example, to realize scale economies or link
complementary assets. Competition policy oversight of outright
consolidations or cooperation by contract can help ensure that such
measures are not mere efforts to create a private variant of the
predecessor public monopoly.Y
3. Redressing Private Trade Restraints
Even with extensive efforts to liberalize foreign and domestic
trade, transition economies still may remain vulnerable to harmful
private trade restraints.85  Consider four scenarios involving
horizontal collusion. Trade liberalization may do little to improve
competition in various services and local goods markets. 86 In many
developed and developing countries, service sectors feature collusive
efforts by incumbent sellers to raise prices by setting fees, allocating
sales opportunities, and restricting entry. Although entry into some
services might seem relatively easy and capable of destroying cartel
discipline, 87 incumbent suppliers nonetheless may succeed in jointly
restricting output. This is particularly true where incumbents
coordinate their affairs through trade associations or other insti-
tutions that the government previously has recognized as legitimate
dealing together with privatization, lest the managers of privatized firms defeat subsequent
efforts to install these controls, so too with competition and trade policy, lest the private owners
defeat efforts to reduce their monopoly rents.").
84. See Rausser, supra note 16, at 329-30 (describing the rationale for antitrust oversight of
holding companies that may take shape in the wake of privatization measures).
85. For an extensive overview of possibilities for harmful private trade restraints in
developing nations, see PATRICK REY, COMPETITION POLICY AND DEVELOPMENT (1997) (on
file with author).
86. See Jatar, supra note 52, at 259 (reporting on experience with competition systems in
transition economies and finding that "many competition agencies have found it useful to give
high priority to nontradable sectors and quasi-nontradable products such as perishables and
those with low price-volume ratios (paints, beverages), since potential foreign competition will
have little or no impact on local firm behavior"); Anne 0. Krueger, Institutions for the New
Private Sector, in THE EMERGENCE OF MARKET ECONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note
1, at 219, 223 (stating that "preventing anti-competitive practices among domestic producers of
nontradable goods" poses "major challenges" to "the governments of Eastern European
countries"); Willig, supra note 67, at 190-91 (describing limited capacity of free trade to
stimulate competition in local goods and services markets).
87. Godek points to ease of entry as a reason for emerging markets to forego establishing
statutory prohibitions on cartels. Godek, One U.S. Export, supra note 62, at 21.
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fora for orchestrating sectoral activity8M A statutory prohibition on
cartels could include a clear statement forbidding output restrictions
through trade associations or similar instrumentalities and with-
holding immunity where the government previously has acquiesced in
the private ordering of output.
A second rationale for anti-cartel enforcement is to prevent the
continuation of patterns of inter-firm relationships that flourished
during the period of planning. Central planning, with its regime of
production quotas and price controls, ingrained in the managers of
individual firms an ethic of cooperation that may persist even when
an emerging market has formally liberalized the economy. 9 Even
when a government enacts laws that allow enterprises to set their own
production levels and choose their own prices, the cooperation ethic
will not disappear instantaneously. Business operators might
continue privately to abide by conduct norms that the state once
mandated. 9° An anticollusion measure in a competition law could
serve a useful purpose by making clear that the government will not
tolerate private efforts to recreate collective planning techniques that
the country has abandoned.
The third scenario concerns public procurement. Public pur-
chasing authorities are common targets for collusive schemes
throughout the world.9' Collusive tendering poses especially grave
dangers in transition economies where public purchasing accounts for
a substantial part of national economic activity and public projects,
such as transportation infrastructure development, are vital to
economic growth. An anti-cartel measure in a competition law could
88. See Kovacic, supra note 68, at 1206 (discussing the use of trade associations to set prices
and control bidding for construction projects in Zimbabwe).
89. See Paul L. Joskow et al., Competition Policy in Russia During and After Privatization,
in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 301, 306-24 (Martin N.
Baily et al. eds., 1994) (reviewing the extent and methods of state oversight of business units in
Russia during the Soviet era).
90. See Karen Turner Dunn et al., The Meat Processing Sector in Mongolia, in DE-
MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION POLICY IN POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES, supra note
52, at 107, 110 (finding that despite economic liberalization measures, Mongolian meat
producers continued to use private agreements to determine what prices they would bid for
livestock and to delineate territories in which their meat would be sold).
91. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
COMPETITION POLICY AND PROCUREMENT MARKETS 7 (1999) (on file with author) ("There is
general agreement, though it is not unanimous, that certain characteristics of public buyers
render them to become more likely to be the victims of collusion."); Kara L. Haberbush, Note,
Limiting the Government's Exposure to Bid-Rigging Schemes: A Critical Look at the Sealed
Bidding Regime, 30 PUB. CONT. L.J. 97, 98 (2000) ("[C]ertain aspects of the government
procurement process may be particularly vulnerable to antitrust abuses, especially bid-
rigging.").
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provide a valuable tool for punishing and deterring efforts to rig
public tenders.
The fourth possible setting for anti-cartel enforcement involves
international collusive schemes. In recent years, the exposure of
international price-fixing cartels involving food additives and vitamins
has demonstrated the ability of multinational enterprises to carry out
global schemes to allocate territories and curb production.92 It is
likely that the cartels in question have raised prices to consumers and
industrial purchasers in transition economies. An anti-cartel
mechanism would enable the transition economy to seek redress for
injuries imposed by international cartels and to cooperate with
foreign competition authorities in prosecuting cross-border collusive
arrangements.93
The emphasis upon collusion enforcement scenarios above re-
flects a general view among those who favor antitrust intervention as
an element of transition economy competition policy that "clear and
tough" rules against hard-core horizontal restraints supply the
appropriate core of law enforcement.94  Anti-cartel enforcement,
however, does not necessarily exhaust the range of desirable
applications of antitrust enforcement in the transition process.
Scrutiny of exclusionary behavior by dominant incumbent firms may
92. The prosecution of the international food additives and vitamins cartels is discussed in
Harry First, The Vitamins Case: Cartel Prosecutions and the Coming of International
Competition Law, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 711 (2001).
93. Laffont describes the threat that international producer cartels pose to economic
growth in transition economies:
In developing countries lacking technical, management, and government
expertise, it may be that only foreign investment can help development, because it
brings new technologies and the credibility needed to borrow on international capital
markets. Such investments should be welcomed if they help build local capacity. But
when international cartels engage in anticompetitive practices, foreign investment can
undermine economic development in developing countries. For this reason it is clearly
desirable to make progress in global competition policy to discipline international
cartels.
Laffont, supra note 8, at 245-46 (citation omitted). The establishment of a competition policy
authority could provide the transition economy government with a necessary platform for
cooperating with foreign competition agencies in policing international cartels.
94. See Willig, supra note 67, at 195; see also Jatar, supra note 52, at 259 (competition rules
in transition economies "must be simple and straightforward" and "should prohibit horizontal
agreements among competitors, including price cartels"). But see Singleton, supra note 67, at 6-
8 (discouraging reliance on per se rules to address horizontal restraints in transition economies
and suggesting that antitrust statutes simply deny enforcement of "naked price fixing
provisions" due to doubtful persistence and adverse consequences of such arrangements and
"limited judicial and bureaucratic abilities that characterize most developing countries";
proposing that transition economy statutes instead emphasize control of dominant firm
exclusionary behavior by giving the competition agency broad power to challenge a wide array
of entry-deterring conduct).
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be necessary where, for example, the state previously has created or
permitted monopolies to control the distribution of goods. The
operation of a distribution monopoly will retard expansion of trade
within the country and diminish the capacity of imported goods to
press domestic producers to improve performance. 9
4. Deterring Corruption
The corruption of government officials is a serious problem in
many transition economies, especially in nations that have relied
heavily on central economic planning. 96  In transition economies,
government bodies have tremendous power to affect the competitive
process when they issue licenses, permits, franchises, and subsidies.
For poorly paid and weakly monitored civil servants, the authority to
dispense entitlements and privileges creates countless opportunities
to solicit bribes.97 Where traditional safeguards to ensure transpar-
ency and integrity in public administration are feeble, individual
business operators may enjoy great success in bribing public officials
to obtain special benefits or deny privileges to their opponents.
A competition policy system could help undermine corrupt
agreements between government officials and business managers. 98 A
number of transition economy competition laws directly limit the
ability of government agencies to diminish competition.99 Some
measures forbid government bodies to restrict entry by, for example,
95. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1764 (discussing impediments to successful
privatization in the former Soviet Union and observing that "poor transportation and state-
owned local distribution monopolies often limited import and interregional competition");
Jatar, supra note 52, at 259 ("In Latin America the enforcement of competition since
liberalization has been instrumental in lowering entry barriers to foreign competition,
particularly where dominant local firms have used vertical mechanisms to control distribution
channels.").
96. See Rick Stapenhurst & Shahrzad Sedigh, Introduction: An Overview of the Costs of
Corruption and Strategies to Deal with It, in CURBING CORRUPtON 1 (Rick Stapenhurst & Sahr
J. Kpundeh eds., 1999) (describing the pervasiveness of corruption in many transition
economies); Samantha Marshall, Vietnam Puts a Price Tag on Corruption, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
May 27, 1999, at 1 (describing the results of a Vietnamese government study that documents
massive corruption by public officials).
97. See Daniel Kaufmann, Economic Reforms: Necessary but Not Sufficient to Curb
Corruption?, in CURBING CORRUpTION, supra note 96, at 89, 94-95 (describing regulatory and
entitlement-related functions that create opportunities for corruption in transition
environments).
98. See Kovacic, supra note 4, at 442 (discussing the use of a competition policy system as
an anticorruption device).
99. See Roger Alan Boner & William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy in Ukraine, 31 GEO.
WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 23-25 (1997) (discussing limits in Ukraine's antitrust system upon
anticompetitive government intervention).
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imposing licensing requirements, unless the national legislation
expressly grants such authority. Other provisions bar public officials
from granting exclusive franchise rights or otherwise discriminating
improperly against entrepreneurs that seek access to the market.
Enforcement of these and similar measures can complicate the
formation and execution of corrupt agreements between public
officials and private individuals. The competition policy mechanism
essentially prevents the public official (the seller) from fulfilling her
promise to the payer of the bribe (the buyer) to provide an illicit
economic privilege. The competition law does not directly sanction
the payer or recipient of the bribe by subjecting them to civil or
criminal punishment. Rather, it diminishes the gains from improper
bargains by impeding the execution of the promises that form the
core of any single corrupt agreement and diminishes the maintenance
of stable buyer-seller relationships that characterize corruption in
many settings.1°° By raising the costs of conceiving and executing
corrupt arrangements, the competition policy system can help prevent
their creation.
C. Facilitating the Transition from Planning to Markets
Extensive, long-lived reliance on central planning can create a
pervasive suspicion of capitalism. Comprehensive planning limits the
exposure of citizens to market mechanisms, and government policies
continually reinforce the notion that the state is the sole appropriate
conservator and manager of the nation's economic resources. In
many countries, efforts to decentralize the economy take place in a
political and social context that is wary of markets and fearful that the
state's retreat from its traditional role as producer and protector will
endanger consumer interests.
In such environments, it may be unrealistic to expect that the
government will commit itself to economic liberalization without
establishing a mechanism to address market failures. 1 1 Without the
creation of a competition policy system (and other measures such as a
100. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and the Global Economy, in CORRUPTION AND
INTEGRITY IMPROVEMENT INITIATIVES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 25, 25 (1998) (analyzing
patterns in corruption and noting how "[c]orrupt buyers and sellers frequently develop systems
that are mutually reinforcing and persist over time").
101. See William E. Kovacic & Robert S. Thorpe, Antitrust and the Evolution of a Market
Economy in Mongolia, in DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPETITION POLICY IN POST-
COMMUNIST ECONOMIES, supra note 52, at 89, 92 (describing the role of an antitrust system in
facilitating the political transition to a market system).
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consumer protection regime and environmental protection mecha-
nisms), a nation may choose not to undertake measures such as
decontrolling prices or privatizing state-owned enterprises. Viewed
in this light, a competition policy system can facilitate the transition
from planning to markets by demonstrating the government's
commitment to address serious market failures. The competition
policy system becomes an outward symbol of a basic change in the
government's role from planner and producer to referee.
D. Synthesis: The Link between Competition Policy and Capability
Discussions about competition policy in emerging markets some-
times suggest that the policy choice confronting transition govern-
ments and their foreign advisors is between establishing no
competition statute or competition policy bureau on the one hand, or
immediately adopting a competition law with the full array of
provisions found in wealthy market economies. Posing the question
this way ignores a host of intermediate options that might be
desirable for a number of countries. The "do nothing" and "do
everything" solutions are neither the exclusive competition policy
options nor, in most countries, are they sensible formulas.
1. Phasing Reforms
The all-or-nothing solution set obscures important intermediate
possibilities. One alternative is to vary the initial design of a
competition policy system according to the host country's existing
capabilities and resources and the strength of commitments by
foreign advisors to provide implementation assistance. 102 A country
with weak initial capabilities and uncertain assurances of foreign
assistance sensibly might choose to begin with a more austere
102. In the context of discussing possible strategies for pollution control in transition
environments, Laffont addresses .the importance of accounting for institutional capabilities in
designing policy commands:
[W]hat if the agency in charge of the environment is nonexistent, poorly staffed, or
captured by the industry, or if the pollution is diffuse and cannot be measured at the
individual level? A barrier to entry, such as a license to operate, may then be the only
way to limit production and therefore pollution, at least if this policy can be
implemented and is not a pretext for rent seeking. The right policy answer should take
into consideration many aspects of the problem that are not easily measured or even
modeled. Thus it is not surprising that the right answers may differ by industry or
country, particularly between industrial and developing countries.
Laffont, supra note 8, at 238-39; see also William E. Kovacic, Capitalism, Socialism, and
Competition Policy in Vietnam, ANTITRUST, Summer 1999, at 59, 61 (arguing for the use of
strategies that gradually phase in competition policy as implementation capacity increases).
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competition policy system that emphasized advocacy and education
and forbade a narrow range of behavior, such as hard-core horizontal
restraints. As capabilities and implementation resources increase, the
host country could augment its law. An alternative is to enact a
relatively elaborate law but expressly phase in the implementation of
certain operative provisions over time as the country's capabilities
grow. There are many examples from the history of competition law
in transition economies and mature market systems to rebut the
notion that a nation gets a single chance to formulate a competition
law and therefore must pack every conceivable power or responsibil-
ity into the original statute.103
It would also be reasonable to begin with a more ambitious
competition policy system-with fuller advocacy and law enforcement
powers-in emerging markets with strong institutional foundations
and substantial resource commitments from foreign advisors.
Countries with greater capabilities and resources stand a stronger
chance of making good use of an ambitious competition policy system
than countries with weak institutions and few resources. There is a
great difference between Jamaica, which appears to have received $9
million in the early 1990s from the US Agency for International
Development to create its competition mechanism, 10 4 and many other
transition economies that will be fortunate to receive even a tenth of
that amount from foreign sources to build their own systems. The
point to keep in mind is that a decision to move from a more austere
competition policy system to a more complex design should be
justified by showing that there are measures in place to ensure
effective implementation.
Two examples from other areas of law reform suggest how the
design of a reform strategy and the emphasis of different reform
elements might vary from country to country, depending upon one's
evaluation of initial conditions. The first example involves privati-
zation in Russia in the 1990s. Privatization reformers had to decide
the relative importance to be given to privatizing small firms and
large firms, respectively, and to building the institutional framework
for ensuring sound corporate governance.1 05 The strategy actually
103. Examples in mature antitrust systems include Australia, Canada, and the United States.
Transition economy examples include Brazil, South Africa, and South Korea.
104. See Geraldine Foster, Antitrust in Transition Economies, in 2000 FORDHAM CORP. L.
INST. 563, 564 (B. Hawk ed.) (containing remarks made at the Fordham Corporate Law
Institute on International Antitrust Law & Policy in New York City on October 14-15, 1999).
105. Black et al., supra note 17, at 1797-1800.
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chosen gave primary emphasis to rapidly privatizing small and large
firms and to making the establishment of the legal framework, in
effect, a secondary priority. A more effective approach might have
involved rapidly privatizing small enterprises, undertaking a slower
"staged privatization" of large firms, reallocating some of the efforts
actually devoted to large firm privatization into creating the
supporting institutional infrastructure, and focusing greater attention
to establishing a "friendlier business climate," mainly through
reforms in the tax system. Such an approach does not dispute the
elements of the reform agenda pursued by the "big bang" privati-
zation advocates, but it suggests changes in the relative emphasis
given to specific elements. 1°0
The second example involves the choice of policies for reforming
infrastructure sectors such as energy and telecommunications in
transition economies. As described by Paul Joskow, one reform
model is a "'big bang' approach" in which "privatization, restruc-
turing, and the introduction of competition occur at the same time."'10 7
The alternative "gradualism" approach "is to provide for a relatively
long transition period, during which the industrial organization and
associated regulatory institutions are allowed to evolve according to a
planned transition program."108 Joskow concludes that the suitability
of either approach-big bang or gradualism-depends on six factors:
[Tihe performance of the existing system, the complexity of imple-
menting a big bang approach given pricing and other imperfections
that cannot be fixed instantly, the capacity of legal and political in-
stitutions to support competitive markets for infrastructure ser-
vices, the speed with which reasonably competitive markets can
evolve, the time required to create effective regulatory institutions,
and the government's ability to credibly commit to a restructuring
framework that supports private investment and competitive en-
try. 109
Among other considerations, Joskow's factors directly account for the
quality of institutions whose efficacy will determine the impact of the
infrastructure privatization and deregulation program. Differences in
such conditions across countries would dictate different strategies in
the continuum of approaches between an immediate big bang and
protracted gradualism. Joskow concludes that infrastructure
"regulatory agencies may do best by starting with simple regulatory
106. Id. at 1778 (describing the content of introducing privatization in stages).
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rules and procedures and refining them as they gain information and
experience. '"110
The framework for analyzing the timing and content of privati-
zation and infrastructure reforms can be applied to competition
policy as well. The correct dosage of individual competition policy
reform elements would depend on a country's initial conditions and
the need for donors and the host country to make choices in how to
use scarce technical assistance resources. There is no particular
reason to think that the competition policy reform strategy for each
nation would be identical in its content or the timing of its implemen-
tation.
2. Shared Tasks
A second basis for variation is to consider possibilities for multi-
national regional cooperation in building competition policy
institutions. Consider the case of neighboring states whose insti-
tutions are weak and whose prospects for obtaining substantial
foreign assistance for implementing new measures are poor. Rather
than individually attempting to construct elaborate competition
policy institutions, such countries might seek to develop regional
alliances through which members delegate certain functions (such as
the adjudication of disputes) to a common instrumentality.
1"1
IV. COMMON INITIAL CONDITIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATION FOR
LAW DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
A common theme in the foregoing analysis of competition sys-
tem design possibilities is the centrality of initial conditions and
implementation. To be effective, competition policy law reform
strategies require careful pre-reform analysis of existing conditions in
the host country and rigorous attention to how the host country will
implement nominal competition policy commands. Accounting
properly for these concerns is a vital ingredient of effective reforms.
Transition economy antitrust agencies confront implementation
challenges that are largely alien to their Western counterparts.
Decisions about the appropriate design of antitrust systems in
emerging economies must acknowledge the distinctive features of the
110. Id. at 220.
111. See Kovacic, supra note 6, at 42-43 (describing possibilities for regional cooperation in
the "Caribbean Community").
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transition environment. Western antitrust systems benefit from a
number of favorable circumstances, including access to substantial
financial resources, wide availability of expertise in antitrust
economics and law, broad acceptance of administrative safeguards to
restrict the discretion of public decision makers, and reliance on well-
established market processes. These conditions rarely characterize
the transition economy experience. Approaches that have proven
effective in Western countries are hardly assured of success when
transplanted into a transition economy setting.
A. Durability of Public Policies That Impede Competition
Despite adoption of various economic liberalization measures,
many transition economies continue to feature substantial resistance
to market-oriented reforms inside and outside the government. Such
resistance often is manifest in the maintenance of substantial
government-imposed barriers to entry and exit. In many instances,
competition-suppressing policies persist at all levels of government
despite nominal measures by the national legislature to encourage
private entrepreneurship and new business development.11 2
1. Barriers to Imports and Foreign Investment
A number of transition economies maintain significant barriers
to participation by foreign companies in their domestic market. In
some cases, obstacles to trade take the form of substantial tariffs and
quotas. Countries that formally have reduced tariffs and quotas
sometimes replace these measures with nontariff trade barriers that
eliminate or severely curb competition from imports."3 National
regulatory regimes also place cumbersome limits on the ability of
foreign firms to enter the market directly by constructing new
facilities or investing in existing domestic enterprises.
112. See Irina Starodubrovskaya, The Nature of Monopoly and Barriers to Entry in Russia, 6
COMMUNIST ECON. & ECON. TRANSFORMATtON 3, 13 (1994) (discussing techniques used by
local government authorities in Russia to control commercial activity and limit competition
despite efforts by the national government to promote economic liberalization).
113. See Andras Nagy, Institutions and the Transition to a Market Economy, in THE
EMERGENCE OF MARKEr EcONOMIES IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 1, at 301, 305 ("It is
luckily difficult for the new [transition economy] governments formally to resist formal trade
liberalization, but-under the influence of the big lobbies behind them-they learn quickly how
to build non-tariff barriers.").
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2. Restrictions on New Business Development
Transition economy governments maintain a variety of barriers
to entry and exit. Some transition economies impede entry by
imposing significant burdens on firms seeking to incorporate or
otherwise register to do business. In Vietnam, firms seeking to
register must satisfy formidable initial capital requirements and must
present a business plan that is subject to review and approval by
government officials. 114  In reviewing business plans, government
overseers often take account of whether there is "sufficient capacity"
in the business sector into which the business operator wants to enter.
This screen is a frequently used tool to deny approvals to private
firms whose operations might threaten sales of incumbent state-
owned enterprises.
3. Complex and Arbitrary Taxation Systems
A second common impediment to entry and expansion by pri-
vate firms is the tax system. Tax codes in many transition economies
discourage legitimate private sector development. One pathology is
to set rates at extraordinarily high levels and closely monitor the bank
accounts of business operators to determine whether taxable cash
balances are available for confiscation. The use of high marginal tax
rates and the monitoring of bank account or balance sheet surpluses
as taxation points create a host of perverse incentives for small and
large enterprises alike. Many entrepreneurs choose to forego
ordinary registration requirements and operate outside the bounds of
the law as "informal" enterprises, denying the state any tax revenues
from their operations and precluding the informal firms from availing
themselves of mechanisms, such as judicial enforcement of contracts,
that properly registered enterprises can use to undertake substantial
investments and reduce operating costs. Companies may refuse to
pay workers or suppliers to avoid giving tax authorities the impres-
sion that they have funds available to pay additional taxes.'15 Other
114. See NGUYEN DINH CUNG, SOME REMARKS OF THE MARKEr STATE IN VIETNAM
(1997) (on file with author) (describing how business formation and registration formalities curb
competition by raising barriers to entry by new firms).
115. One study describes how the tax system induces company managers in Russia to hide
income and engage in barter transactions. Black et al., supra note 17, at 1757-60. In evaluating
the causes of failure for the Russian privatization program in the 1990s, the study concludes that
"perhaps the single most important regulatory obstacle to earning an honest profit is the
Russian tax system." Tax rules all but compelled managers to hide profits from tax inspectors
and shareholders alike. Id. at 1758.
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enterprises refuse to deposit significant amounts of cash in banks.
Instead they take costly precautions to keep cash in private safes or
increase reliance on barter transactions.1 6 The fear of revealing
liquidity also induces companies to publish untruthful financial
statements, thus impeding efforts by investors to make well-informed
judgments about the firm's condition. 17
Transition economy tax codes also tend to be extremely complex
and subject to continuous, selective adjustment. One form of ad hoc
adjustment consists of conceiving special assessments, sometimes
applied retroactively, to business operators who appear to be
profitable. The details of the codes seldom are widely available to
affected business operators, and many operational provisions are
promulgated in the form of regulations or interpretations held
exclusively within the offices of the taxation authority. Governments
frequently delegate enforcement of these measures to public officials,
who use their expansive enforcement discretion to "discover"
violations and gather bribes under the guise of "settling" tax claims.
Taxpayers rarely have recourse to an appeals mechanism, much less a
system of review that affords swift, impartial analysis of tax claims.
4. Price Controls
The abandonment of price controls is a common element of
economic liberalization in the transition environment. Multinational
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank often insist on price decontrol as a condition for
providing loans or other forms of assistance. Researchers have
documented a number of instances where price control regimes
persist despite a government's formal adoption of decontrol
measures. Reforms undertaken at the national level lack significance
when individual national ministries, regional government bodies, or
local public officials establish surrogate mechanisms whose operation
is more difficult for external institutions to monitor.118
116. See Clifford G. Gaddy & Barry W. Ickes, Russia's Virtual Economy, 77 FOREIGN AFF.
53 (1998) (describing an increased reliance in Russia on cashless barter transactions because
maintenance of cash in bank accounts attracts the attention of tax authorities).
117. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1758 ("Companies that can't report income honestly
to the tax inspectors also can't report honestly to investors. Investors therefore can't use a
company's financial statements to check on management honesty and skill.").
118. See MURRELL ET AL., supra note 77, at 7 (discussing how local governments in
Mongolia regulated prices despite the national government's abandonment of price controls).
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5. Restrictive Labor Laws
A number of transition economies have labor laws that severely
restrict the ability of an employer to adjust the size of its workforce. 119
One common form of control is to forbid layoffs or make termination
decisions very costly. By limiting the firm's flexibility to reduce
employment when demand for its products sags, the labor regime can
discourage companies from expanding capacity. The adoption of
more flexible retention and termination policies could encourage new
business development.
B. Fragile Political Foundations
New competition authorities often begin with weak political
foundations. In some countries, the new agencies represent
institutional innovations, such as the creation of an independent
regulatory body in a country that has no history of such agencies. In
other nations, the new competition authority has been given a
familiar, widely accepted institutional form. Even if the agency is
created within an existing ministry or established as a new entity
similar in form to other government bodies, it usually will begin
operating without the political ties and power base that its adversaries
inside and outside the government will enjoy. New competition
bodies continually must ask whether the exercise of nominally
significant powers will arouse debilitating political opposition.
C. Weak Indigenous Competition Policy Expertise
Most transition economies begin implementing new competition
policy systems and other types of market-oriented legal reforms with
relatively little indigenous expertise in competition law or industrial
organization economics. 20  This condition is one dimension of a
general deficiency that afflicts economic law reform programs in
transition economies. In examining reform efforts in former
command economies, Michael Trebilcock points to "the critical
119. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1761-62 (describing restricting labor laws in Russia).
120. See James Langenfeld & Dennis A. Yao, Competition Policy and Privatization: An
Organizational Perspective, in GOVERNMENTS AND MARKETS 195, 205-07 (Hendrikus J.
Blommestein & Bernard Steunenberg eds., 1994) (discussing human resource problems
confronting new antitrust agencies); William E. Kovacic, The Competition Policy Entrepreneur
and Law Reform in Formerly Communist and Socialist Countries, 11 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 437,
452-60 (1996) (discussing the limited pool of transition economy individuals who are expert in
antitrust economics or law).
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shortage of what might be called 'the human capital of capitalism'-
legal, managerial, economic, accounting, statistical, and so on-
required to effectuate and operate a market economy and, from a
public sector perspective, to regulate or otherwise address its
dysfunctions or limitations effectively.' 1 21 Laffont warns that human
capital "shortcomings are usually underestimated, despite their
dramatic implications for many areas of public policy.'
1 22
In the short term, antitrust agencies and other government
agents of market reform must rely heavily on a handful of individuals
who either have studied or worked in Western universities, or have
participated extensively in training programs through which foreign
experts provide instruction in the fundamental economic and legal
underpinnings on competition policy. Over time, the pool of
indigenous experts may expand as university programs in business,
economics, law, and public administration reformulate their curricula
to teach courses relevant to developing a market economy.
Transition economy agencies often find that professionals who have
become expert in antitrust economics or law become extremely
attractive to private sector employers. Rapid turnover in personnel is
common.
D. Dysfunctional Courts
In many transition economies, the courts are ill suited to adjudi-
cate antitrust disputes, either as tribunals of the first instance or as
appellate overseers of administrative competition policy bureaus.
Few judges have even a rudimentary understanding of market
processes, let alone comprehension of the basic rationale for and
elements of an antitrust system. Corruption and delay deeply infect
many transition economy court systems, denying the judiciary
legitimacy as a forum for resolving business disputes.
123
121. Michael J. Trebilcock, What Makes Poor Countries Poor?: The Role of Institutional
Capital in Economic Development, in THE LAW AND ECONOMUCS OF DEVELOPMENT 15, 50
(Edgardo Buscaglia et al. eds., 1997).
122. Laffont, supra note 8, at 242.
123. See Edgardo Buscaglia, Corruption and Judicial Reform in Latin America, 17 POL'Y
STUD. J. 273 (1996); Sergio Garcia-Rodriguez, Mexico's New Institutional Framework for
Antitrust Enforcement, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1149, 1177 (1995) (stating that Mexico's "judicial
system is perceived by many as plagued with considerable delays, institutional corruption and a
lack of independence"). One recent study describes how weaknesses in the Russian judicial
system prevent effective enforcement of laws designed to ensure honest corporate governance:
[A] shareholder who sues a major company will usually lose at trial and first-level
appeal, because of home-court bias, judicial corruption, or both. A shareholder with a
strong case has a decent chance of getting an honest decision on further appeal, but
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E. Frail Transparency Safeguards and Vulnerability to Corruption
Few transition economies have adopted mechanisms for ensuring
transparency in operations of government ministries, including
competition authorities. Most countries lack basic controls on
bureaucratic discretion, such as requirements that policy adjustments
be promptly and widely publicized (or subject to comment and debate
before their enactment). Procedures for ensuring the confidentiality
of business records or preserving the integrity of settlements of
disputes are uncommon. Effective mechanisms for obtaining
expeditious review of agency decisions are rare. The lack of
transparency creates frequent opportunities for corruption and
deprives the legal system of the clarity needed to provide meaningful
guidance for business operators.
124
A number of transition economies recognize that developing new
competition agencies presents an opportunity to establish models for
improving public administration. In transition economies such as
Mexico and Ukraine, for example, the new competition agencies
present possibilities for significant improvements over existing
administrative structures. Means to this end include the promul-
gation of rules that insulate competition authorities from political
interference, compel disclosure of the content of and rationale for
agency decisions, and permit affected parties to challenge deviations
from procedural requirements.
F. Resource Shortages
Most transition economy competition agencies labor under
oppressive resource shortages. Civil servants often are paid
minuscule wages, making it difficult for the competition agency to
retain capable professional staff and creating temptations for
employees to accept bribes in return for relaxing nominal regulatory
that will take years. And judgments must be enforced (or, often, not enforced) by the
same biased or corrupt lower court where the case began.
Black et al., supra note 17, at 1755.
124. See Clague et al., supra note 16, at 80 ("Fair and transparent procedures for property,
contracts, and government regulation of business facilitate the entry of low- and middle-income
people into many areas of economic life. They also promote the accumulation of physical and
human capital, which raises wages."); Garcia-Rodriguez, supra note 123, at 1178 ("In the not-
too-distant past, Mexican administrative entities enjoyed unbridled discretionary power
selectively to enforce legal requirements against individuals or firms. The bureaucratic
structure for administrative enforcement in Mexico was tailor-made for the extension of
political favors and other forms of corruption.").
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requirements. Many agencies struggle with little success to obtain
minimally adequate quarters, office equipment, and reference
materials.
G. Data Shortcomings
Transition economy antitrust agencies typically must operate
with limited access to data that offers an accurate view of existing
market conditions and the competitive significance of individual
firms.'25 Competition authorities often rely on official government
statistical records that use classification schemes that correspond
poorly with the economic concept of an antitrust relevant market.
126
Government data sets also may fail to reflect important categories of
activity, such as imports, or the contributions of important groups of
market participants, such as operators in the informal sector who do
not formally register as business enterprises. 127 Calculating market
shares without accurate data on the identity of market participants
and the size of their activities is treacherous.
Gaining direct access to company records may be difficult or
fruitless, at least for some period of time. Especially in the early
period of a new competition agency's operations, business managers
may resist requests for records until the country's courts have
validated the agency's authority to obtain data and demonstrated
their willingness to enforce compulsory process. Where public law
enforcement institutions are weak, business managers may threaten
government antitrust officials with violence if such officials insist on
collecting company documents or interviewing employees. Even
where competition authorities obtain company records, such data
may provide an uninformative view of the firm's significance. Many
firms in formerly planned economies maintain data that reveals little
about the true economic value of their assets, the size of their sales, or
their profitability.
125. See Ben Slay, From Monopoly Socialism to Market Capitalism, in DE-
MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPEITION POLICY IN POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES, supra note
52, at 1, 8-9 (describing methodological difficulties in defining markets and measuring
concentration in transition economies).
126. See Adam Torok, Competition Policy and De-monopolization in Hungary After 1990, in
DE-MONOPOLIZATION AND COMPEITON POLICY IN POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIES, supra
note 52, at 24, 31 (discussing problems with official government statistical records in Hungary).
127. Georges Korsun and I traveled to Benin in March 1998 to perform research on
competition policy under a project sponsored by the US Agency for International
Development. In interviews with participants in the trucking industry, we discovered that
roughly 80 percent of all trucking industry operators in Benin are "informals."
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Official records and internal company data also may fail to give
a clear view of ownership patterns. Privatization and economic
liberalization blur the boundaries of individual firms and complicate
the analysis of inter-firm relations as existing companies are bought
and sold, as firms form joint ventures, and as new enterprises are
created. In some countries, government and company records may
not account for inter-firm connections that take shape through family
relationships or personal friendships. Such relationships have great
economic significance in some settings, as they serve to unify the
operation of seemingly independent economic entities.
128
H. Implications
The design of a competition policy system must account for
initial conditions that will determine the effects of enforcement. A
thoughtful assessment of initial conditions not only will influence
decisions about the content of the statute but also will force foreign
advisors to identify weaknesses in supporting institutions and offer
plans to enhance their capability. It should be clear to donors that the
real measure of a law reform initiative is not simply the quality of the
original statutes but the strength of programs to build the institutional
capacity to apply them effectively. 129
The interplay between initial conditions and institutional design
is evident in two illustrations. The first concerns the decision about
whether to create private rights of action to enforce a competition
law. In principle, decentralizing enforcement authority to private
citizens can act as a valuable safeguard against default-for reasons of
inadequate resources, sloth, or corruption-by a public prosecutor.
In practice, the value of a private right of action depends crucially on
the quality of the tribunal that will adjudicate cases initiated by
private parties. In a country with dysfunctional courts, it makes little
sense to create a private right of action and do nothing more than
channel lawsuits through the existing judicial process.130 A decision to
create a private right of action requires an immediate commitment of
128. See Jatar, supra note 53, at 19-20 (describing the significance for competition policy of
family relationships in Latin America).
129. See Laffont, supra note 8, at 253 ("Because competition is not an automatic outcome of
deregulation, simply conditioning loans on the existence of competition laws will not ensure the
creation of proper institutions for effective competition. Only a strong state can implement
competition.").
130. See Coate et al., supra note 52, at 53 ("Unless a well-developed and experienced court
system exists, [private] civil suits would not be advisable.").
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resources to rehabilitate existing tribunals or create new judicial
bodies to hear the cases that private entities invoking the competition
law are likely to file. The second illustration involves merger control.
One element of establishing a merger control regime is to determine
the thresholds of activity that will trigger the obligation of merging
firms to report their transactions to the competition authority. 31 The
wisdom of a specific threshold for any single competition agency
depends heavily on the agency's resources. Merger analysis has
proven to be the most resource-intensive activity for new competition
agencies. Agencies that set reporting thresholds too low will find
themselves swamped with reviewable transactions, including a
substantial number of mergers with no conceivable competitive
significance. Establishing comparatively high thresholds may be the
only means that impoverished agencies can use to focus scarce
resources on matters of the highest importance.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
A careful assessment of the predicates for successful competition
law reforms and of the initial conditions in transition economies has
basic implications for how countries with older antitrust systems
provide technical assistance. Perhaps the most fundamental lesson is
that the successful development of competition policy institutions in
transition environments will require extensive, sustained contri-
butions from foreign governments in the form of human and physical
capital. It is irresponsible for Western governments and multi-
national donors to promote the establishment of antitrust laws or the
adoption of other economic law reforms without providing extensive
assistance in preparing and implementing the new legal mecha-
nisms.1
32
A. Building Foundations for Creating New Competition Systems
The possibilities for success in preparing new legislation or de-
signing new institutions are likely to increase if such initiatives are
131. See Boner & Kovacic, supra note 99, at 37-40 (discussing the importance of defining
reporting requirements in the context of Ukraine's antimonopoly law); Kovacic, supra note 12,
at 1097-99 (describing the selection of reporting thresholds).
132. See Laffont, supra note 8, at 250 (discussing economic liberalization and financial
services reform and observing that "the most effective aid is aid that helps to design those
regulatory institutions"; concluding that "it is irresponsible to advocate liberalization without
providing such aid").
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informed by careful study of the host country's existing conditions.
This involves analyzing the economic, legal, political, and social
context in which reforms will take place. An accurate diagnosis of
initial conditions requires collaboration by foreign advisors with host
country specialists.
A thoughtful pre-reform analysis serves four major purposes.
The first is to guide the assessment of how to draft the original
competition policy statute. The pre-reform assessment will help
identify the types of public and private competitive restraints that
warrant attention and indicate what types of institutions the
competition law should create or augment. No sensible system of law
reform would try to draft legal commands or design institutions
without such an evaluation of initial conditions.
The second purpose is to formulate possible priorities and com-
petition policy strategies for the new competition policy institution.
The initial assessment can assist in diagnosing the obstacles to
effective competition and proposing their cures. Case studies of
specific industry sectors might reveal that the chief impediment to
new business development is a government policy that would be an
appropriate target for advocacy efforts (or direct prohibition in the
competition statute). Industry analysis also might reveal common
practices-such as the tendency of various trade associations to adopt
bylaws that set fee levels or control bidding-which the competition
agency might challenge.
The third objective is to identify implementation needs and
formulate a plan for building the competition agency and enhancing
the capability of institutions-such as courts and universities-on
which the agency will depend to function effectively.
The fourth reason to perform an extensive pre-reform assess-
ment is to identify existing institutions that the competition authority
can draw upon or adapt to execute its responsibilities. 13 For example,
an existing social network might provide a conduit for communicating
information about the operation of the new competition policy
regime and performing educational programs. Indigenous organi-
zations might play a role in detecting deviations from competition
policy norms or assist in resolving community-level disputes.
133. See Melinda Smale & Vernon Ruttan, Social Capital and Technical Change: The
Groupements Naam of Burkina Faso, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra
note 1, at 182, 183 (describing how existing indigenous cultural and social endowments can
facilitate the development process).
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B. Sustained Assistance During Implementation
The best assistance programs are anchored by the presence of
long-term advisors who reside within the country and work directly
with the host country's competition policy officials. There is a
growing recognition that short-term initiatives, while useful in limited
respects, do little to improve conditions for the longer term.
134
Charles Cadwell makes this point in reflecting upon his experiences
as one of the principal managers of the University of Maryland's
Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector, a major
technical assistance provider:
While assistance such as short-term training and study tours are
helpful if conducted as part of a longer term interaction, IRIS ex-
perience in Russia, Poland, Nepal, Chad, and Mongolia suggests
that, absent sustained interaction, one ought to have limited expec-
tations about the effect of such activities. As frustrating as it is for
us to host study tours that generate much interest but only a brief
exchange without a chance to plumb the details of issues, it is simi-
larly frustrating for local officials and others to host a series of
short-term "development tourists.'1
35
The cost of supporting such operations is trivial compared to the
potential gains in the form of improved institutional capability and
sensible policy making.
C. Regional Cooperation
For many transition economies, regional cooperation can supply
a valuable means for developing new implementation capabilities and
reducing the cost of building new competition policy institutions.
Multinational initiatives such as Mercosur and the Andean Pact
provide opportunities for transition economies to cooperate in
developing enforcement strategies, to harmonize procedures and
substantive standards, and to share best practices.13 6  In some
instances, regional alliances may permit transition economies to
134. See Robert Picciotto, Putting Institutional Economics to Work: From Participation to
Governance, in INSTITUTIONS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, supra note 1, at 343, 363 ("It is
no accident that, where development has failed, basic governance and institutions have usually
been weak. Enhancement of domestic capacities simply cannot be handled within reasonable
time frames without sustained international cooperation and development assistance.").
135. Cadwell, supra note 16, at 267.
136. See Jose Tavares de Araujo, Jr. & Luis Tineo, The Harmonization of Competition
Policies Among the Mercosur Countries (June 1997) (paper presented to the Organization of
American States Trade Unit) (on file with author) (discussing possible use of Mercosur
competition policy protocol to achieve common competition policy approaches).
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reduce the costs of implementation by consolidating certain functions,
such as the investigation of region-wide trade restraints or the
adjudication of cases, in the regional authority. Multinational bodies
whose members include developed and developing economies, such
as ASEAN, APEC, and NAFTA, also can provide useful conduits for
transferring information and know-how from well-established
Western competition systems to newer regimes.
13 7
D. Transferring Knowledge and Investing in Human Capital
In most transition environments, the long-term success of new
competition policy institutions will require considerable effort to
transfer information and expand the pool of individuals with
professional training in market-oriented economics and law. 38
Donors can and must provide some of this training on a short-term
basis in the form of seminars for competition agency enforcement
officials, judges, academics, and members of the private sector. The
more important task is to build a self-sustaining intellectual
infrastructure. 139 Constructing the requisite infrastructure will require
longer-term investments that may not have an immediate tangible
payoff. Such investments include improving university departments
of business administration, economics, law, and public administration
and providing assistance for promising students to obtain graduate
training in Western universities. 14°
E. Continuing Efforts to Evaluate Results
The successful execution of competition policy programs re-
quires a continuing commitment by donor agencies and host country
competition authorities to assess the impact of efforts to design and
137. See Garcia-Rodriguez, supra note 123, at 1193-95 (discussing the use of NAFrA to
coordinate the antitrust policies of Canada, Mexico, and the United States).
138. See WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 5 (stating that "[foreign assistance] projects need
to focus on creating and transmitting knowledge and capacity").
139. See id. at 83 ("Creating knowledge does not mean that donor agencies (or the experts
they hire) have chunks of technical or engineering information that they simply transmit to aid
recipients"; observing that the knowledge that matters "must be created locally and
internalized").
140. See Black et al., supra note 17, at 1801-02 (discussing the possible value to market
reforms in Russia of foreign aid investments in building Russian business and law schools and
paying for Russian students to study in foreign graduate programs); WORLD BANK, supra note
13, at 17, 55 (describing the positive impact of donor funding for future transition economy
policy makers' overseas study).
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implement the competition policy system. 141 Continuing assessment
of implementation experience is a necessary ingredient of any
competition policy program. 42
CONCLUSION
The extraordinary pace of creation of competition policy systems
in emerging markets raises a series of interrelated issues about law
reform. The first issue is whether competition policy deserves a high
priority on the agenda of economic reform measures. The answer
that commentators give to this question depends on how we define
competition policy. There seems to be a universal consensus that
transition economies should take affirmative measures to increase
business rivalry as a tool for promoting growth. Most observers
appear to agree that creating an institution to advocate pro-market
solutions, to educate business leaders, public officials, and citizens
about the merits of a market system, to perform industrial organi-
zation research, and to undertake an antitrust enforcement program
against collusion among competitors is appropriate. The sharpest
point of disagreement involves the wisdom of establishing the full
panoply of antitrust commands found in mature competition policy
systems.
In encouraging transition economies to create competition policy
systems, Western nations and multinational bodies have tended to
slight grave problems that emerging markets will encounter in
implementing the new statutes. In most transition countries, there is
a significant mismatch between national implementation capabilities
and the demands of new competition laws, especially where statutes
dictate enforcement of the elaborate commands found in experienced
Western antitrust systems.
To decide about the correct measure of completeness and com-
plexity in transition economy competition policy systems, one must
confront the mismatch between well-developed conceptions from
Western experience about the optimal design of laws and the existing
institutional capacity of emerging markets to implement them. As
Jean-Jacques Laffont has observed, the potential mismatch between
141. See WORLD BANK, supra note 13, at 27 ("[Donor] agencies should be asking
themselves continually: Why do we do what we do? And what is the impact?").
142. See William E. Kovacic, Evaluating Antitrust Experiments: Using Ex Post Assessments
of Government Enforcement Decisions to Inform Competition Policy, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV.
843 (2001) (making a case for evaluating the outcomes of competition policy programs).
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legal commands and institutional capabilities forces one to make a
fundamental choice: "Do we take a purely normative view or do we
take into account political and administrative constraints? 143 Many
modern law reform programs, including competition policy projects,
have tended to begin by creating the conceptually ideal legal regime
on the assumption that political and administrative constraints that
will influence the application of the law can be resolved later. There
is a growing awareness among commentators, including many
participants in the foreign assistance process, that issues of insti-
tutional capability deserve far greater attention in designing laws and
timing their application. The modern literature identifies a number
of possibilities for adjusting the sequence of law reforms to ensure
that host countries attain the institutional capacity to implement
nominal legal commands.
The expanded emphasis on institutional capability has significant
implications for technical assistance. Law reform projects are more
likely to succeed in promoting economic development when donors
satisfy certain conditions. Law drafting and institutional design
should build upon careful pre-reform analysis of economic, political,
and social conditions conducted by indigenous specialists and foreign
advisors. Successful reform measures require close attention to
enhancing the capacity of a wide variety of institutions- among them,
universities, research institutions, professional societies, and courts-
whose effectiveness is vital to the operation of the legal regime. The
key to setting the proper institutional foundation and encouraging
sensible application of new laws is a durable commitment to provide
assistance, anchored by a sustained, in-country presence of foreign
advisors.
143. Laffont, supra note 8, at 238.
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